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ABSTRACT
Across cities, estimates of local land rents and firm productivity are inferable from wage and housing-cost
data using knowledge of the housing cost function. Differences in amenity values are capitalized into
the sum of local land values and federal-tax payments. A calibrated model is used to predict how amenities
are capitalized into land rents, wages, and housing costs, and with U.S. data, to estimate land-rent,
firm-productivity, and total amenity-value differences of cities. Private land values vary mainly from
consumption amenities, while social land values, from productive ones. The most productive and valuable
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Standard economic theory predicts that the value of land will completely reﬂect differences in the
economic value of local amenities – such as clean air or public infrastructure – when all other
factors of production are fully mobile (see, e.g., Ricardo 1817, George 1879, Tiebout 1956, Arnott
and Stiglitz 1979). This kind of equilibrium environment forms the basis of hedonic methods used
to value individual amenities (see, e.g., Oates 1969). Furthermore, across cities with distinct labor
markets, local wage levels indicate the degree to which amenities directly beneﬁt ﬁrms, by raising
their productivity, or directly beneﬁt households, by improving their quality of life (Rosen 1979,
Roback 1982). In this type of long-run environment, this paper examines how different amenities,
particularly those for ﬁrms, are reﬂected in local prices, especially for land. It also estimates
differences in the total value, or ”worth,” of amenities across U.S. cities, and investigates how
these differences may be inﬂuenced by certain observable amenity measures.
Unfortunately, comparable data on land values are exceedingly rare, which makes determining
amenity values much more complicated.1 Without land values, researchers have typically turned
to readily available data on local housing values, often assuming that a percentage difference in
housing values, say of 10 percent, reﬂects a similar percentage difference in land values (Beeson
and Eberts 1989, Rauch 1993, Dekle and Eaton 1999, Haughwout 2002, Gabriel and Rosenthal
2004, Glaeser and Saiz 2004, Shapiro 2006, Chen and Rosenthal 2008). This assumption may lead
to underestimated land-value differences, since land accounts for only a fraction of housing costs,
and other costs due to capital and labor differ far less across cities. Furthermore, cost differences
arising from local wage levels are observable and can be accounted for to isolate costs due to land.
Other housing-cost determinants may be unobservable, most importantly productivity differences
in the local housing sector, possibly from geography or regulations. These make it more difﬁcult
to infer land and amenity values.2
1This paper does not address temporal issues that would make land rents deviate from land values by more than
an interest rate, and so the terms ”rents” and ”values” are used interchangeably. As land is combined here in a model
with labor and housing services, it is more appropriate to think of the prices here as referring to ﬂow values rather than
asset values.
2Davis and Polumbo (2007) infer the costs of land rents across metropolitan areas by subtracting construction
1The difﬁculties associated with missing land-value data are concentrated in determining the
value of amenities for ﬁrms, which the same literature (i.e., the list in the preceding paragraph)
attempts to do. As shown below, amenities that raise the productivity of ﬁrms producing trad-
able goods (across cities) raise wages and housing values together, while amenities that raise the
productivity of ﬁrms that produce local goods (not tradable across cities) instead, lower wages
and housing values in the same proportion. Without data on land values, which reﬂect both types
of amenities positively, we may confuse low productivity in local goods for high productivity in
tradable goods. Even if amenities for non-tradable production are absent, estimates of productiv-
ity in tradables will be biased, under-weighing housing-cost differences and over-weighing wage
differences, if they do not incorporate the cost structure of housing.
Furthermore, only by accounting for the cost-structure of housing and other non-tradables can
we realistically calibrate this kind of model to the national economy and use it to predict how
amenities to households and ﬁrms affect the local prices of land, labor, and housing. As demon-
strated in Albouy (2009), a realistic calibration takes into account federal taxes, which distort the
relationship between the values of amenities and the value of land. In short, by indirectly tax-
ing amenities that raise wages, and subsidizing those that lower them, taxes cause amenities for
tradable production to be under-capitalized in land values, while causing amenities for households
or non-tradable production to be over-capitalized. Numerically, these effects are quantitatively
important, especially for productive amenities in tradables, which have 37 percent of their value
appropriated by federal and state governments, rather than local land. It also appears that quality-
of-life amenities have their value reﬂected much more in higher local prices than in lower wages.
Local wage levels do reﬂect over 100 percent of the value of trade-productive amenities. Produc-
tive amenities in non-tradables raise land values by more than their value, but only weakly lower
local prices and wages.
costs, obtained from R.S. Means, from observed housing data. While insightful, this methodology implicitly assumes
that the suburban sample of houses is representative, that housing productivity does not vary across metropolitan areas,
and that there are no other costs, such as expenditures to overcome regulatory burdens, to producing housing other
than construction and land costs. As mentioned below, Rappaport (2008a, 2008b), uses a model similar to the one
here, but for different applications.
2Using readily available data on wages and housing costs from the 2000 U.S. Census, I provide
new estimates of inter-metropolitan differences in local-ﬁrm productivity, land values, and total
amenity values, combining them with quality-of-life and federal-tax differential estimates from
Albouy (2008, 2009). These are based on the assumption, implicit in the previous literature, that
cities do not vary in the productivity of their housing and local-goods sectors. This leaves out
their inﬂuence on local land values, but has little impact on estimates of productivity in tradables.
According to these data, the three most productive metropolitan areas are San Francisco, New
York, and Los Angeles. The least productive cities are generally small and isolated.
San Francisco also claims prize being the most valuable city in the United States, as it has the
most valuable combination of amenities in consumption and production. The remaining top 15
includes a number of large, productive, cities – Honolulu, San Diego, Los Angeles, New York,
Seattle, Boston, Denver, and Chicago – as well as small, pleasant ones – Santa Barbara, Monterey,
San Luis Obispo, Cape Cod, Santa Fe, and Naples. Across cities, production amenities account
for a larger proportion of value differences than quality-of-life amenities. Yet, because federal
taxes tax the former and subsidize the latter, consumption amenities have a greater impact on the
value of land. Nevertheless, production amenities appear to account for the lion share of wage and
housing-cost differences across the United States, contrary to claims made by Roback (1982).3
Lastly, I examine the value of individual amenities using hedonic methods based on cross-
sectional correlations. This resembles analyses seen in the previous literature for quality-of-life
amenities, but goes further by including productive amenities. Interestingly, tradable productivity
is associated with larger city sizes and higher education levels, in line with estimates in the liter-
ature that use a simpler measure of productivity. Sunniness, coastal proximity, and mild seasons
appear to be amenities for both ﬁrms and households, while hilly terrain is a disamenity for ﬁrms.
Accounting for ﬁscal externalities from taxation, the most valuable cities in the United States may
be summed up as being typically large, mild, sunny, coastal, and well-educated.
3Roback (1982) states that ”the combined evidence seems persuasive that the regional differences in earnings can
be largely accounted for by regional differences in local amenities,” where by ”local amenities,” she appears to be
referring to quality-of-life amenities only.
32 Prices and Amenities in Equilibrium
2.1 Model Set-up and Basic Notation
To explain how prices vary with amenity levels across cities, I use the general equilibrium model of
Albouy (2009), which adds federal taxes to the Rosen (1979) and Roback (1980, 1982) model. The
national economy contains many cities, each small relative to the national economy, and indexed
by j. These cities trade with each other and share a homogenous population of mobile households.
Households consume a numeraire traded good, x, and a non-traded ”home” good, y, with local
price, pj. In application, the price of home goods is measured by the ﬂow cost of housing services,
although theoretically they should also proxy for cost-differences in all locally-provided goods.4
Firms produce traded and home goods out of land, capital, and labor. Within a city, factors
receive the same payment in either sector. Land, L, within each city is homogenous and immobile,
and is paid a city-speciﬁc price rj; each city’s land supply, Lj(r), may depend positively on rj,
with a ﬁnite elasticity "
j
L;r 2 [0:1). Capital, K, is fully mobile across cities and is paid the
price  { everywhere. The supply of capital in each city, Kj, is perfectly elastic at this price, while
the national level of capital may be ﬁxed or depend on  {. Households, N, are fully mobile, have
identical tastes and endowments, and each supplies a single unit of labor. Because households
care about local prices and quality of life, wages, wj, may vary across cities. Nationally, the total
number of worker-households is ﬁxed at NTOT =
P
j Nj.
Households own identical diversiﬁed portfolios of land and capital, and payments to these
factors are rebated lump sum, with payments R = 1
NTOT
P




from capital. Total income, mj  R + I + wj, varies across cities only as wages vary. Out of this
income, households pay a federal income tax of  (m), which the federal government redistributes
back in uniform lump-sum payments. Deductions and state taxes have only a minor impact on the
estimates, and so I discuss them in Appendix B.5
4Non-housing goods, such as haircuts and restaurant meals, are considered to be a composite commodity of traded
goods and non-housing home goods. I discuss multiple types of home goods in Appendix D.4, which shows that if
housing is more land-intensive than non-housing home goods, then housing will more strongly reﬂect amenity values.
5Results are robust to elastic labor and land supply, so long as the new units supplied are equivalent to existing
4Cities differ in three general attributes: (i) quality of life, Qj, which raises household utility; (ii)
the level of productivity in the traded-good sector, A
j
X, or ”trade-productivity;” and (iii) the level
of productivity in the home-good sector, A
j
Y, or ”home-productivity.” These attributes depend on a




K), through functions Qj = e Q(Zj), A
j
X = f AX (Zj), and
A
j
Y = f AY (Zj). For a consumption amenity, e.g., safety or clement weather, @ e Q=@Zk > 0; for a
trade-production amenity, e.g., navigable water or agglomeration economies, @ f AX=@Zk > 0; for a
home-production amenity, e.g., ﬂat geography or the absence of land-use restrictions, @ f AY=@Zk >
0. An amenity may affect more than one attribute, or affect an attribute negatively. To simplify,
each city attribute is normalized to have an average value of one over cities.
2.2 Equilibrium Conditions
The utility function U (x;y;Qj) represents household preferences, and is quasi-concave over x and
y, and increasing in quality of life, Qj. The dual expenditure function for a household, e(pj;u;Qj)
measures the cost of consumption needed to attain utility u, and is increasing in pj, and decreasing
in Qj. Since households are fully mobile, no city can offer a higher level of utility than another,
and so all inhabited cities must offer the same utility,  u.6 This means that ﬁrms in cities with higher






Operating under perfect competition, ﬁrms produce traded and home goods according to the
functions X = A
j
XFX(LX;NX;KX) and Y = A
j
YFY(LY;NY;KY), where FX and FY are
concave and exhibit constant returns to scale. All factors are fully employed and have the
units (Roback 1980) Also, results do not change if the government uses tax revenues to purchase tradable goods.
6Formally, e(pj;u;Qj)  minx;yfx + pjy : U
 
x;y;Qj
 ug. The use of a single index Qj assumes that
amenities are weakly separable from consumption. The model generalizes to one with heterogenous workers that
supply different ﬁxed amounts of labor if these workers are perfect substitutes in production, have identical homothetic
preferences, and earn equal shares of income from labor. Additonally, the mobility condition need not apply to all
households, but only a sufﬁciently large subset of mobile marginal households (Gyourko and Tracy 1989). Appendix
D.3 discusses the case with multiple household types that vary in preferences and skills.





X where c(r;w;i)  c(r;w;i;1).7 A symmetric deﬁnition holds for the unit cost
of a home good, cY. As markets are competitive, ﬁrms make zero proﬁts in equilibrium. Therefore,
for given output prices, more productive cities must pay higher rents and wages to achieve zero












Roback (1982) presents a similar three-equation model of this form, but never applies it. Instead
she uses data on land values in a simpliﬁed two-equation model, which reduces the last equation to
rj = pj. Such a model ignores the fact that the price of many local goods also depends on the price
of local labor, as explained by Tolley (1974). Subsequent analyses have relied on this two-equation
model using housing values instead of land values: this practice is better for modeling households,
but worse for modeling ﬁrms.8
This model of spatial equilibrium expressed in equations (1), (2), and (3) provides a one-to-





the latter are are exactly identiﬁed when all three prices are observed. These conditions hold even
when the attributes are endogenous, and thus are well-suited for the purpose of measurement. They
are less well-suited for comparative statics, as they do not capture potential feedback mechanisms,
such as a dependence of A
j
X on population size, Nj, through agglomeration economies. 9
7cX(rj;wj; {;A
j
X)  minL;N;KfrjL + wjN +  {K : A
j
XF (L;N;K) = 1g:Appendix D.3 demonstrates that
productivity differences that are not Hicks-neutral have similar impacts on relative prices across cities, but not on
quantities.
8While Roback (1982) applies her two-equation model with actual land values, she also expresses strong doubts
about the quality of her land value data and their ability to capture the value of productive amenities. Subsequent
authors, includingBlomquistetal. (1988), BeesonandEberts(1989), andGyourkoandTracy(1989, 1991)equateland
with housing, which is not a problem when only the value of quality-of-life amenities is considered. An authoritative
review of the amenity literature in Gyourko et al. (1999), uses the Rosen-Roback model extensively, but makes no
mention of this third equation.
9To appreciate the potential complexity of comparative statics, say that a city’s population, Nj, pollutes it, lowering
Qj. If a city receives a theme-park, improving Qj, this will attract migrants, raising Nj and indirectly lowering Qj
through pollution, confounding the effect. Yet, it may be possible to measure the value of the theme-park if pollution
62.3 Expenditure and Cost-share Parameters
For households, denote the share of gross expenditures spent on traded goods and home goods
as sj
x  xj=mj and sj
y  pjyj=mj; denote the shares of income received from land, labor, and
capital income ass
j
R  R=mj, sj
w  wj=mj, and s
j
I  I=mj. For ﬁrms, denote the cost-shares
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X=Kj. Assume home goods are more cost-intensive in land relative to

















N. To help keep track of this notation, table 1 summarizes the main parameters, which
without superscripts, refer to national averages. and shows their values calibrated in Section 3.1.10
TABLE 1: MODEL PARAMETERS
Parameter Notation Calibrated Value
Home-goods share sy 0.36
Income share to land sR 0.10
Income share to labor sw 0.75
Traded-good cost-share of land L 0.025
Traded-good cost-share of labor N 0.825
Home-good cost-share of land L 0.233
Home-good cost-share of labor N 0.617
Share of land used in traded good L 0.17
Share of labor used in traded good N 0.70
Average marginal tax rate 0 0.361
Average deduction level (see Appendix)  0.291
or population levels are controlled for.
10These shares obey the identities L = sxL=sR, N = sxN=sw, and K = sxK=sI.
72.4 Log-Linearization of the Equilibrium Conditions
To make them empirically transparent and allow for calibration, I log-linearize conditions (1), (2),
and(3)toexpresseachcityj0spricedifferentialsintermsofitsattributedifferentials, relativetothe
national average. These differentials are for logarithms so that, for any variable, z, ^ zj = dlnzj =
dzj= z  = (zj    z)= z, approximates the percent difference in city j of z; relative to the geometric
average  z, with E[^ zj] = 0. The one exception to this notation is ^ Qj   (@e=@Q)(1= m)dQj,
which represents the fraction of gross income a household is willing to pay to live in city j to enjoy
its quality of life, relative to an average city.11
Log-linearized versions of (1), (2), and (3) describe how prices co-vary with city attributes.12
 sw(1   
0)^ w
j + sy^ p
j = ^ Q
j (4a)
L^ r
j + N ^ w




j + N ^ w
j   ^ p
j = ^ A
j
Y (4c)
These equations are ﬁrst-order approximations of the equilibrium conditions around a nationally-
representative city. These ﬁrst-order expressions are useful analytically, and appear to be fairly
accuratefortherangeofdataconsideredintheUnitedStates. AsdiscussedinAppendixA, second-
order approximations of the equilibrium conditions, which account for endogenous shifts of the
share values, do not produce appreciably different inferences under plausible parametrizations
except at the very extremes of the data.
Equation (4a) measures local quality of life from how high the cost-of-living, sy^ pj, is relative to
11This analysis does not take into account changes in the willingness-to-pay for amenities, and does not assign any
particular unit to Qj, so that  (@e=@Q)dQj, the monetarized willingness-to-pay to live in city j, cannot be mean-
ingfully decomposed. Therefore, ^ Qj is better interpreted as a compensating differential, rather than a compensating
variation – see Rappaport (2008b) for how these may differ.
12When simply linearized with Shephard’s Lemma, the system of equations produces
 (@e=@Q)dQj =  y  dpj   (1   0)  dwj
dA
j
X = (LX=X)  drj + (NX=X)  dwj
 p  dA
j
Y = (LY =Y )  drj + (NY =Y )  dwj   dpj
The ﬁrst equation is log-linearized by dividing through by  m, and the third, by dividing by  p.
8after-tax nominal income, sw(1 0)^ wj. Equation (4b) measures local trade-productivity, ^ A
j
X, from
how high the labor costs, N ^ wj, and land costs, L^ rj, are in traded-good production. Equation
(4c), measures local home-productivity, ^ A
j
Y, from how high the labor costs, N ^ wj, and land costs,
L^ rj, are in home-good production relative to the home-good price, ^ pj. Stated in reverse, cities are
inferred to have low home-productivity if the price of home goods is high relative to the local input
costs. Each equilibrium condition states that the relative value of a city’s amenities to households
or ﬁrms is measured implicitly by how much they will pay for them.
With data on wage, housing-cost, and land-rent differences across all cities, as well as knowl-
edge of the average parameter values, equations (4a) to (4c) produce estimates of the attribute
differentials ^ Qj; ^ A
j
X, and ^ A
j
Y. Without data on land rents, ^ rj, quality of life, ^ Qj, is still identiﬁed;
but trade-productivity, ^ A
j
X, and home-productivity, ^ A
j
Y, are under-identiﬁed without an additional
restriction.
2.5 Inferring Land Rents and Productivity from Housing Costs and Wages
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N ^ w





Thus, land-rent differentials differ from housing-cost differentials through three effects. First, the
land-shareeffect, whichimpliestheland-rentdifferentialis1=L > 1multipliedbythehome-good
price differential attributable to land. Second, the labor-cost effect, as the labor-cost component
of the home-good price, N ^ wj, is a confounding element: researchers must subtract this to isolate
housing-value differences due to land costs. Third, the home-productivity effect, as a city with
high home-productivity, has home-good prices that are low relative to the value of land, since it
produces so efﬁciently. Holding wages and home-good prices constant, cities with greater home-
productivity have higher land values.
With land-rent data, trade-productivity differences are measurable directly from (4b); without




















This differs from the formula in previous studies, ^ A
j
X = L^ pj + N ^ wj, through the same effects
mentioned above. The land-share effect requires that home-good price differentials are weighted
by L=L > L, as housing-cost differentials typically understate land-rent differentials. The labor-
cost effect implies that wage differentials should be weighted by N   NL=L < N, as higher
wages lead to higher housing costs: failing to make this adjustment double-counts the labor-costs
included in ^ pj. The home productivity effect implies that cities with high home-productivity have
land values understated by home-good prices, meaning that trade-productivity estimates are also
understated. The last effect implies that, when only wages and home-good prices are observed,
low home-productivity may be mistaken for high trade-productivity, as both are positively associ-
ated with high wages and home-good prices. The magnitude of this mistake depends on the ratio
L=L.13
2.6 The Capitalization of Amenity Values and their Total Value
Inverting the system of equations (4a) to (4c) reveals how quality of life, trade-productivity, and
home-productivity determine local land rents, wages and home-good prices. To make it easier
to compare equations, I multiply each differential by its share of income, so that each equation
expresses the change in land, labor, and home-good values relative to average total local income.
Thus, a one-percent increase in sR^ rj represents an increase in land values equal to one percent of
13To aid intuition, consider two extreme cases. In the ﬁrst case, traded goods are made without land, i.e. L = 0,
and so trade-productivity is given by the wage level alone, ^ A
j
X = N ^ wj. This case, commonly assumed, appears
to be reasonable as L in modern production is small. But the variation in ^ pj, and more fundamentally ^ rj, may be
large relative to the variation in ^ wj, so that it provies substantial additional information about ^ A
j
X. Furthermore,
with housing costs in equation (6), it is the ratio L=L that matters, and this ratio may be much larger than L if
L is small. In the second case, the cost shares in both sectors are the same, i.e. L = L, and N = N, in
which case trade-productivity is given by ^ A
j
X = ^ pj + ^ A
j
Y . Holding home-productivity constant, trade-productivity is
given by home-good prices since they reﬂect the input costs of traded-good ﬁrms exactly. But then, trade-productivity
differences are perfectly confounded by home-productivity, which lowers home-good prices in the same proportion
that trade-productivity raises them.
10income. Each attribute is also multiplied by its weight in determining household welfare. Accord-
ingly, a one percent increase in sx ^ Aj
x has a value equal to a one-percent increase in consumption.
With these normalizations, I express the inverted system below using only the fractions of land































































































where the subscript ”0” denotes price differentials without taxes, and lj = Lj=Nj is the land-to-
labor ratio. Recall these expressions are log-linearizations around the national average.
The ﬁrst expression (7a) demonstrates how wage levels increase with trade-productive ameni-
ties, but fall with quality-of-life and home-productive amenities. Taxes augment the capitalization
of all amenity values by the factor 1=(1   0L=N) > 1, as higher tax payments are compensated
with higher wages, causing positive feedback effects.
When 0 = 0, the second equation, (7b), expresses the canonical result that land values capture
the total value of amenity differences, denoted
^ 

j  ^ Q
j + sx ^ A
j
X + sy ^ A
j
Y = sR^ r
j
0: (8)





which is normalized to express how much, more or less, households in a particular city pay in
federal income taxes relative to their total income. Consequently, land values capitalize quality-
of-life and home-production amenities by more than their value, as they lower wages and with
11them, federal taxes. Land values capitalize trade-production amenities by more than their value as
they as they raise wages and tax burdens.14 Ultimately, the full value of an amenity is reﬂected by
its impact on federal tax revenues as well as land values, and researchers must account for both to
determine their full value. When land-value data are missing, researchers may measure the total
value of amenities using
^ 









j + ^ A
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which comes from substituting (5) into (8). Here, it is unclear whether higher wage levels signal
greater city value, as the positive federal-tax effect, 0 (1   L), runs counter to the negative labor-
cost effect,  (1   N), from using housing rather than land-value data.
Equation (7c) expresses how amenities are capitalized into local home-good values. Over-
all, home-good prices capitalize amenities very differently than land values, especially for home-
production amenities, which lower home-good values and raise land values.15 Federal taxes in-
crease how much home goods capitalize quality-of-life amenities and decrease how much they
capitalize production amenities of either kind.
While it is already evident from equation (6) that trade- and home-productivity are not sepa-
rately identiﬁable from wage and housing-cost data, equations (7a) and (7c) make this intuition
clearer. Trade-productive amenities for ﬁrms raise the wages of local workers, increasing the de-
mand for local goods, raising their price so that their value rises in proportion to the after-tax
wage bill. On the other hand, home-productive amenities lower the price of home goods through






Per capita, (L=N)drj is the change in land value,  (@e=@Q)dQj is the improvement in quality-of-life across the
resident population, (X=N)dA
j
X is the decrease in costs in local production of tradables, and (pY=N)dA
j
Y is the
decrease in costs of the local production of non-tradables. These expressions differ from those in Albouy (2009)
because the are expressed in terms of the differential value relative to all income, and use factor fractions, , rather
than cost-shares.
15Roback (1982, p. 1265) reports a linear analogue to equation (7c) without taxes in her equation 9, expressed
in derivatives of cost and indirect utility functions. Roback states that the effect of improvements in quality-of-life
on non-traded prices is ambiguous, although this is not true if non-traded goods are relatively land intensive, an
assumption which could be used to support Roback’s assumption that the determinant in equation 9 () is greater
than zero.
12greater supply. These lower prices attract workers and allow ﬁrms to pay them less, so that the
after-tax wage bill is lowered by the same amount.16 Both types of amenities affect wages and
housing-cost in the same proportion, albeit in different directions. Thus, it may be impossible to
distinguish a city where both types of productivity are high, say Atlanta, from a city where both
types of productivity are low, say Richmond. If we can observe land values, it is possible to distin-
guish them as land values should be higher in Atlanta than in Richmond, controlling for quality of
life. As I show below, home-productivity is much harder to identify than trade-productivity, which
can be estimated fairly accurately from (6) assuming A
j
Y = 0. This assumption poses more of a
problem for estimating land values from (5) since these are heavily inﬂuenced by differences in
home-productivity.
Lastly, as I explain in Appendix B, tax beneﬁts for home-good consumption, such as mortgage-
interest deductions for housing, increase the local value of amenities that lead to higher home-good
costs, i.e., those that raise quality of life or trade-productivity or lower home-productivity.
2.7 Simple Hedonic Regressions using Amenity Measures






ties for households, rather than for ﬁrms, never treating the two together in a uniﬁed way, as I do
here. This involves running seven, mutually-consistent regressions, assumed to be linear for sim-










where v 2 f ^ w; ^ p; ^ Q; ^ AX; ^ r;d=m; ^ 
). As the system is linear, the amenity coefﬁcients, k; express
the effect of a one-unit increase in an amenity to the regressor. The amenity coefﬁcients, kv,
16This discussion igmores the important feedback effect of higher land rents on wages through the local labor
market, similar to that described by Tolley (1974). The term 1=N = 1=[1   (1   N)] =
P1
k (1   N)
k, in (7)
accounts for this multiplier effect: a rise in land-values by ^ rj, directly raises home-good prices by L^ rj, raising overall
cost-of-living by syL^ rj. To compensate households, ﬁrms raise wages by 1=sw times this amount, (sy=sw)L^ rj,
raising home-good prices indirectly by N (sy=sw)L^ rj = (1   N)L^ rj, and leading to further feedback effects.
13share the same interrelationships as their corresponding regressors, v, do, as expressed in (4), (9),
(7), and (10). Together, these regressions estimate the full social value of each amenity through
^ 
; splitting it into values received by households and ﬁrms through ^ Q and ^ AX. The regressions
also decompose the value of an amenity retained locally in land values through ^ r, and the value
appropriated federally in tax revenues through d=m.
Because home-productivity is unobserved, the estimates of r, AX, and 
 are ﬂawed, and there-
fore it is helpful to to control for observable factors which might inﬂuence home-productivity.
In addition, these cross-sectional regressions have many well-known empirical caveats – includ-
ing omitted variable bias, simultaneity, multi-collinearity, and small sample problems – and so
we should not expect them to produce conclusive results. Nevertheless, the exercise in Section
4.5, below, is suggestive and illustrates how the estimates are interrelated, providing guidance and
understanding for future research.
3 Calibration and Capitalization Predictions
3.1 Parameter Choices
Asthelog-linearizedmodelisanapproximationaroundthenationalaverage, Icancalibrateitusing
national statistics. Because of accounting identities, only six parameters are free, but choosing
these requires reconciling slightly conﬂicting sources.
Starting with income shares, Krueger (1999) makes the case that sw is close to 75 percent.
Poterba (1998) estimates that the share of income from corporate capital is 12 percent, and thus
sI should be higher, and is taken as 15 percent. This leaves 10 percent for sR, which is roughly
consistent with estimates in Keiper et al. (1961) and Case (2007).17
Turning to expenditure shares, Albouy (2008), Moretti (2008), and Shapiro (2006) ﬁnd that
housing costs can also be used to approximate non-housing cost differences across cities. The
17The values Keiper et al. (1961) reports were at a historical low: that total land value was found to be about 1.1
times GDP. A rate of return of 9 percent would justify using sR = 0:10: Case (2007), ignoring agriculture, estimates
the value of land to be $5.6 trillion in 2000 when personal income was $8.35 trillion, implying a smaller share.
14cost-of-living differential is sy^ pj, where ^ pj is equal to the housing-cost differential and sy is the
expenditure share on housing plus an additional term to capture how a one-percent increase in
housing costs predicts a b = 0:26-percent increase in non-housing costs. In the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey (CEX), the share of income spent on shelter and utilities, shous, is 0.22, although
the share of income spent on other goods, soth, is 0.56, with the remaining 0.22 spent on taxes
or saved (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002). Thus, the coefﬁcient on housing costs is equal to
sy = shous + sothb = 0:22 + 0:56  0:26 = 36 percent. This leaves sx at 64 percent.18
I choose the cost-shares to be consistent with the expenditure and income shares above. L
appears small: Beeson and Eberts (1989) use a value of 0.027, while Rappaport (2008a, 2008b)
uses a value of 0.016. Valentinyi and Herrendorff (2008) estimate the land share of tradables at 4
percent, but because their deﬁnition of tradables makes this an upper bound, I use a value of 2.5
percent for L here.
Following Carliner (2003) and Case (2007), I use a cost-share of land in home-goods, taken as
housing, L, at 23.3 percent: this is slightly above values reported in McDonald (1981), Roback
(1982), and Thorsnes (1997), in order to take into account for secular increase in land cost-shares
over time, seen in Davis and Palumbo (2007). Together the cost and expenditure shares imply
that sR is 10 percent, consistent with other income shares, and that L is 17 percent. This seems
reasonable as the remaining 83 percent of land for home goods includes all residential land and
considerable commercial land.19
The one remaining choice determines the cost-shares of labor and capital in both production
sectors. As separate information on K and K is unavailable, I set both cost-shares of capital to
18Utility costs account for one ﬁfth of shous, which means that without them this parameter would be roughly 0:18.
As shown below, taking out utility costs would be largely offset by larger differentials in housing costs, ^ pj.
19These proportions are roughly consistent with other studies. In the base calibration of the model, 51 percent of
land is devoted to actual housing, 32 percent is for non-housing home goods, and 17 percent is for traded goods,
including those purchased by the federal government. Keiper et al. (1961) ﬁnd that about 52.5 of land value is in
residential uses, a 22.9 percent in industry, 20.9 percent in agriculture. Case (2007), ignoring agriculture, ﬁnds that in
2000 residential real estate accounted for 76.6 percent of land value, while commercial real estate accounted for the
remaining 23.4 percent. Appendix D.4, there may be advantages to modeling housing and non-housing home goods,
separately, but there is little additional information on non-housing goods to calibrate this model better. My suspicion
is that non-housing home goods are less land-intensive and more labor-intensive than housing goods. Accounting for
this would likely lower the implied share of total income going to land.
15be equal at 15 percent to be consistent with sI. Accounting identities then determine that N is
82.5 percent, N is 62 percent, and N is 70.4 percent.
The federal tax rate includes taxes on income and payroll, as well as relevant state taxes due to
variation in wages within states. While the effective tax rate varies a little, it may be approximated
with a marginal tax rate, 0, of 36.1 percent. Appendix B.3 contains details on these taxes, as well
as tax beneﬁts for housing.
3.2 Predicted Capitalization Effects
Withthecalibratedparametervalues, thecapitalizationformulasin(7)predictexactlyhowamenity
values are capitalized into local prices. Table 2 reports how a one-dollar increase in the local value
of quality of life, trade-productivity, or home-productivity affects the value of local land rents,
wages, housing costs, federal taxes or total amenities. The coefﬁcients in panel A ignore federal
taxes, providing a simpler counterfactual starting point to understand the capitalization process.
The effects of federal taxes are shown in panel B, with minor adjustments for state taxes and
the deductibility of housing expenditures. Panel C provides direct elasticities, which remove the
income normalizations introduced in Section 2.6; it should be recalled that all of these results are
only exact around the national average, and are only approximations elsewhere..
The ﬁrst row of panel A demonstrates how in the absence in taxes, land values capitalize the
value of local amenities one-for-one, regardless of their origin. A quality-of-life improvement
worth one dollar is offset for households by a 77 cent increase in the cost of local goods and a 23
cent reduction in nominal income, so that real income falls by exactly one dollar. A dollar value
of trade-productive amenities is reﬂected by a $1.19 increase in wages, which are fully offset by
higher local costs, as households are indifferent to this improvement. The coefﬁcient is larger than
one because
In panel B, we see that land rents capitalize only 63 percent of the value of trade-productive
amenities, meaning 37 percent of their value is appropriated by federal taxes. Meanwhile, con-
sumption amenities are effectively subsidized at a rate of 19 percent, and home-production ameni-
16ties at a rate of 8 percent, boosting land values out of proportion with their true values.
Home-good prices capitalize 92 percent of the value of consumption amenities, which are only
weakly reﬂected in lower local wages. This raises serious concerns for studies (e.g. Moore 1998)
that measure the value of household amenities using only nominal wages. Home-good values
capitalize 90 percent of the value of trade-productive amenities, while wages reﬂect 128 percent of
their value. This means that wage-only measures of productivity, often seen in the agglomeration
literature, may be overstated. Finally, home-productive amenities have a small negative effect on
wages, and an even smaller effect on home-good prices. From panel B, we see that taxes have a
fairly minor effect on how wages reﬂect amenities, and slightly larger effects on how home-good
prices capitalize values, increasing the effect of household amenities and decreasing the effect of
production amenities.20 Overall, it appears that home-good prices are almost as good as land values
in reﬂecting the value of quality-of-life and trade-productivity differences across cities, but fail in
reﬂecting home-productivity differences.
4 Prices and the Value of Amenities across U.S. Cities
This application estimates wage and housing-cost differences across metropolitan areas, and uses
them to measure the overall value of differences in amenities, separated into consumption and pro-
duction. Hedonic regressions demonstrate that much of this variation may statistically explained
by speciﬁc amenities.
4.1 Data and Wage and Housing-Cost Differentials
I estimate wage and housing-cost differentials with the 5-percent sample of Census data from the
2000IntegratedPublicUseMicrodataSeries(IPUMS).IdeﬁnecitiesattheMetropolitanStatistical
Area (MSA) level using 1999 OMB deﬁnitions, and treated Consolidated MSAs as a single city
20Rappaport’s (2008b) ﬁnds a capitalization effect of quality of life on wages similar to the one here without taxes,
as his calibration implies similar values of L and N. Unlike the model here, his also directly accounts for non-
linearities using constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility and production functions.
17(e.g. San Francisco includes Oakland and San Jose), as well as all non-metropolitan areas within
each state. This classiﬁcation produces a total of 325 areas of which 276 are actual metropolitan
areas and 49 are non-metropolitan areas. Appendix C provides more details. The large sample
guarantees that the estimated differentials are precise.
To estimate inter-urban wage differentials, ^ wj, I use the logarithm of hourly wages from full-
time workers, ages 25 to 55. These differentials should control for skill differences across workers
to provide an analogue to the representative worker in the model and isolate the effect of a city on
a worker’s wage. Thus, I regress log wages on city-indicators (j
w) and on extensive controls (X
j
wi)
— each fully interacted with gender — for education, experience, race, occupation, industry, and







wi, and use the
estimates of j
w for the wage differentials. Identifying these differentials requires that workers do
not sort across cities according to their unobserved skills. 21 An overstated wage differential for a
city biases trade-productivity upwards and quality of life downwards.
To estimate housing-cost, ^ pj, I use both housing values and gross rents, with utilities, to cal-
culate a ﬂow cost. Following previous studies, I calculate comparable imputed rents for owned
units by multiplying reported housing values by a rate of 7.85 percent (Peiser and Smith 1985) and
adding this to utility costs.22 To avoid measurement error from imperfect recall or rent control, the
sample includes only units that were acquired in the last ten years. I then regress housing costs on
ﬂexible controls (X
j
pi) – interacted with renter-status – for size, rooms, acreage, commercial use,








pi, and use the estimates of j
p for the housing-cost differen-
tials. Proper identiﬁcation of housing-cost differences requires that average unobserved housing
21This assumption may not hold completely, but as argued in Albouy (2008), sorting may be less of an issue
than commonly presumed for three major reasons. First, the variance in wages across metros in observable skills is
relatively small. Second, different types of labor, according to education, are paid remarkably similar premia across
cities. Third, dropping individuals that currently reside in a metropolitan area away from their state of birth changes
the wage differentials by very little.
22Based on an analysis of owner-occupied units, it appears that housing-cost differentials would be, on average, 20
percent larger if utility costs are excluded. In the mobility condition, this would be largely offset by using a value of
sy to exclude utilities that would be 20 percent smaller. In the housing-cost equation, it would suggest that including
utilities should require using a smaller value of L since utilities are likely to be less land-intensive than housing.
However, the value of L already appears to be somewhat low relative to recent studies.
18quality does not vary systematically across cities. An overstated housing-cost differential biases
both trade-productivity and quality of life upwards.23
I divide amenities into two categories and collect their data from various sources. The ﬁrst
category involves natural site-speciﬁc characteristics such as climate and geography, which are
not determined by a city’s inhabitants. These include inches of precipitation, heating-degree days
and cooling-degree days per year (City and County Databook 2000), sunshine out of the fraction
possible (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association 2008), and whether a metropolitan area
is adjacent to a major coast (Atlantic, Paciﬁc, Gulf or Great Lake). The second category involves
amenities that depend on a city’s inhabitants. I only include three types of artiﬁcial ”amenities”
here. The ﬁrst two are metropolitan population and the share of the adult population with college
degrees: these are not standard amenities, per se, but are likely determinants of amenities. The
third, is the Wharton Residential Land-Use Regulatory Index, or WRLURI, provided by Gyourko
et al. (2008), which is used to control for housing-productivity differences.
4.2 Land-Value, Trade-Productivity, and Total-Value Measures
Using the wage and housing-cost differentials from above, I infer land-rent, trade-productivity,
and quality of life with equations (4a), (5), (6), (10), calibrated with the parameters from Section
3.1, and also adjusted for housing deductions and average state taxes. Because land-values are
not separately observed, I must impose a restriction to identify productivity differences. Thus,
I assume there are no home-productivity differences across cities, i.e., ^ A
j
Y = 0, for all j. This
assumption is implicitly made by the previous literature which equates that housing is land, which
also assumes L = 1 and N = K = 0.24
23This issue may not be grave as Malpezzi et al. (1998) determine that housing-cost indices derived from the Census
in this way perform as well or better than most other indices.
24The actual formulas are more complex and differ slightly by state. The simpliﬁed formulas presented are close
approximations based on regression estimates.
19The calibrated equations yield the following relationships, which I call the ”adjusted” model:
^ r
j = 4:29^ p
j   2:75^ w




j = 0:32^ p




X = 0:11^ p
j + 0:79^ w





j = 0:39^ p
j + 0:01^ w
j (+0:39 ^ A
j): (8*)
The terms in parentheses give the bias that results from unobserved home-productivity differences:
this appears to be large for land rents, minor for trade-productivity, and moderate for total value.
Otherwise, the total value is surprisingly well approximated by housing costs, weighted by slightly
more than the home-good expenditure share. This is by coincidence, as the labor-cost and federal-
tax effects through wages in (10) are of opposite and almost equal size.
These relationships are modeled rather differently in the previous literature, which not only
equates land and housing, but ignores federal taxes and, as discussed in Albouy (2008), typically
ignores non-labor income sources and non-housing local costs, setting sw = 1 and sy = 0:25,
leading to the formulae:
^ r
j = ^ p
j (5**)
^ Q
j = 0:25^ p




X = 0:025^ p
j + 0:825^ w
j (6**)
This ”unadjusted” model does not obey the standard income identities, as it assumes that land and
capital income are paid to absentee owners. Thus, there is no clear analogue to ^ 
j, although the
value of amenities as a fraction of resident income is 0:27^ pj.
Figures 1A and 1B illustrate the adjusted and unadjusted models in a coordinate system with
wages and housing costs. Each ﬁgure draws an iso-rent curve for cities with average rent, i.e.
(^ wj; ^ pj) points with ^ rj = 0 in (5); a mobility condition for cities with average quality of life, with
20^ Qj = 0 in (4a); and a zero-proﬁt condition for cities with average productivity, with ^ A
j
X = 0 in
(6). All of these curves intersect at zero, since cities with average wages and housing-costs are
inferred to have average rents, quality of life, and productivity. In the adjusted model, the positive
slope of the iso-rent curve illustrates the labor-cost effect, as higher wage levels increase the cost
of housing at a rate N. The second, thinner, iso-rent curve, corresponding to a rent-differential
of 0.25, illustrates the land-share effect: the adjusted curve intercepts the housing-cost axis at 0.06
' 0.25/L. The mobility condition slopes positively at the rate (1   0)sw=sy; so that housing
costs increase with wage levels to keep real consumption levels from rising. The ﬂatter adjusted
slope accounts for federal taxes, non-housing costs, and non-labor income. The slope of the zero-
proﬁt condition; N   LN=L, is determined by the rate at which housing costs, proxying for
land costs, fall with local wage levels in order for ﬁrms to break even. The ﬂatter adjusted slope
accounts for the greater weight the land-share and labor-cost effects put on housing costs relative
to labor costs. Iso-value curves, tracing out the points where cities have the same total amenity
value, with ^ 
j = 0 in (10), are not drawn: in both models the curves are very ﬂat.
With the adjusted curves, ﬁgure 2 plots the estimated wage and housing cost differences across
U.S. metropolitan areas. The vertical distance between a city’s marker and the average iso-rent
curves, measures the inferred land-rent differential. Figure 3 plots these differentials against hous-
ing costs, and draws a line for how inferred land rents depend on housing costs if wages are held
constant at the national average. The vertical distance between a city’s marker and this line mea-
sures the labor-cost effect, while the distance from the line to zero measures the land-share effect.
The latter tends to be larger, and is negatively correlated with the labor-cost effect since wages and
housing costs are positively correlated.
Figure 4 graphs the quality-of-life and trade-productivity estimates. A change in coordinate
systems from ﬁgure 2 to ﬁgure 4 illustrates visually how these values are inferred. The average
mobility condition in ﬁgure 2 provides the axis for trade-productivity in ﬁgure 4, while the average
zero-proﬁt condition does the same for quality of life. In both ﬁgures, cities with markers above
the average mobility condition have greater quality of life, while those with markers to the right
21of the average zero-proﬁt condition have greater trade-productivity. The average iso-rent and iso-
value curves also pass through the coordinate change, with their downward slope illustrating how
rents and values increase with both quality of life and trade-productivity. The iso-wage curve in
ﬁgure 4 illustrates how wages capitalize productivity much more than quality of life, while the
iso-housing-cost curve illustrates how housing capitalizes both almost equally.
4.3 The Most Productive and Valuable Cities
Table3liststheestimatedwage, housing-cost, land-rent, quality-of-life, trade-productivity, federal-
tax, and total-amenity-value differentials for a selected list of the largest and most valuable cities.
The table also lists values by Census division, and metro areas classiﬁed according to population.
Appendix table A1 presents a complete list of metro areas and non-metro areas by state; Appendix
table A2 lists values by state. These number speak for themselves, but deserve some comment.
The most productive metro area is San Francisco, which includes the area near San Jose known
as Silicon Valley. This is a little surprising, since productive agglomeration economies are thought
to increase with population, and San Francisco is only the ﬁfth largest metro area in the United
States. Yet, the exceptional degree of knowledge spillovers and innovation in the area is well doc-
umented (Saxenian 1994, Florida 2008). The top ten most productive cities contains six other large
metros – New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, Washington, and Detroit – but also three small
metros – Monterrey (Salinas), Santa Barbara, and Hartford. The most plausible explanation for
these small metros is that they are close to much larger, highly-productive metros. The relation-
ship between population levels and productivity, seen in ﬁgure 5, is strongly evident, but contains
many deviations worth investigating. The least productive metro area, Great Falls, MT, is quite
remote, as are the two least productive states, South and North Dakota.
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of the model reﬁnements on the trade-productivity estimates for
a limited range of the data. The methodological reﬁnement of putting more weight on housing
costs is not enormous, but nonetheless changes the relative rankings of many cities, putting Los
Angeles in front of Chicago, Boston in front of Detroit, Denver in front of Las Vegas, and Portland
22in front of Cincinnati.
Overall, the most valuable metropolis in the United States is also San Francisco: it not only
has the highest productivity, but also the fourth highest quality of life. This is followed by six
other Paciﬁc cities – Santa Barbara, Honolulu, Monterrey, San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Luis
Obispo – that offer both high quality of life and fairly high productivity. Next are a number of
highly productive and somewhat amenable large metros – New York, Seattle, Boston, Denver,
Portland, and Washington – as well as resort-like, yet economically vibrant, metros like Cape Cod,
Santa Fe, Naples, Reno, and Fort Collins.
Further down the list are smaller cities in less crowded areas such as in Arkansas, Oklahoma,
West Virginia, Mississippi, and the Dakotas. As seen in ﬁgure 7, the relationship between total
value and city size is fairly strong, given the strong relationship between size and productivity, seen
above, and the weak relationship between size and quality of life (Albouy 2008). The estimates
suggest that an acre of land in San Francisco is about 100 times more valuable than an acre in
McAllen, TX, which has the lowest land value, and that an urban acre in the most valuable state,
Hawaii, is worth almost 50 times an urban acre in the least valuable state, North Dakota.25
4.4 Explaining the Variation of Prices across Cities
Ultimately, it is variation in underlying amenities that determine the variation in housing costs,













One way to assess whether the variance in total amenity values is due primarily to quality-of-
life or productivity differences, is to comparing the two variance terms, since if the variance of
25The results change only slightly if housing-cost measures based only on rental units are used. These measures
better reﬂect the situation in central cities, where 45% of households are renters, rather than in suburbs, where only
27% are renters. Rent-only measures tend to be somewhat lower in places with lot of renters, like California, and
in cities like Detroit, where the central city and the suburbs offer very different amenities. For the most part, using
rents only will tend to lower quality-of-life, and to a lesser extent, trade-productivity estimates in cities where rents
are comparably low.
23either attribute is set to zero, the covariance term collapses to zero. Similar decompositions apply
to wage, housing-cost, and land-value differences. As discussed in Section 2.2, since the model
treats the attributes as ﬁxed, this variance accounting is better for measuring proximate sources
of price variation rather than determining their fundamental sources, which ideally would net out
endogenous effects due to agglomeration and other processes.26
Results of the decomposition in table 4, Panel A, which accounts for federal taxes, reﬂect the
situation in 2000. They reveal that quality of life accounts for a greater fraction of the variation in
land values than does trade-productivity. On the other hand, trade-productivity variation is much
more important in determining overall values. Figure 4 illustrates this, as its axes are scaled so
that attribute differences of equal value are of equal distance: population-weighted, the spread of
cities along the horizontal axis, measuring trade-productivity, is greater than along the vertical axis,
measuring quality of life. The same is true of housing-cost differences, as they strongly reﬂect the
attribute differences we can measure. Wage variation – and with it, variation in federal tax burdens
– is driven almost entirely by trade-productivity.
Panel B presents a counter-factual distribution of rents, wages, and housing-costs with fed-
eral taxes removed, but with amenities distributed in the same manner. In this case, productivity
differences would become even more important in determining land rents and housing costs.27
4.5 The Productive and Total Value of Individual Amenities
Based on the discussion in Section 2.7, table 5 displays the results of the seven regression equations
of the form (11), which relate the measures presented above with the observable amenity measures
described at the end of Section 4.1.
26This decomposition is different than the one in Beeson and Eberts (1989) and Deitz and Abel (2008), who decom-
pose each differential into its productivity and quality-of-life component. Such a decomposition is hard to interpret
since each component may have a different sign. For instance, San Francisco’s wage differential of 0.26 is 119 percent
”explained” by its higher productivity (which, alone, would make it 0.31) and -19 percent ”explained” by its higher
quality of life (which, alone, would make it -0.05).
27It is not clear from the analysis which type of amenity is more important in affecting household location choices.
If quality of life is predominant, then typically ”jobs follow people,” while if productivity is predominant, then ”people
follow jobs.” Analysis from Appendix D.2 suggests that household locations are most similar to land values, and thus,
quality of life is predominant in the presence of federal taxes.
24Controllingforotheramenities, theelasticityofwageswithrespecttopopulationisabout4per-
cent, consistent with estimates surveyed in Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Melo et al. (2009).
Because the elasticity of housing-cost is also large, at 6 percent, the trade-productivity elasticity
is roughly 4 percent, allaying fears that wages may over-state the productivity effects of agglom-
eration across cities. As greater population size is not associated with lower quality of life, larger
cities have greater total value in lieu of their higher productivity. In a similar vein, a ten-percent
increase in the share of adults who ﬁnished four or more years of college (1.3 standard deviations),
is associated with a 7-percent increase in wages and productivity, similar to the ﬁndings in Moretti
(2004) based on more rigorous methods. The corresponding number for quality of life is 1.8 per-
cent, meaning human-capital contributes to quality of life as well as local productivity, reinforcing
ﬁndings in Shapiro (2006), based on instrumental-variable estimates, in a panel of cities.
The positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on the regulatory land-use index (WRLURI) in the
equations for trade-productivity, land rents, and total value are consistent with the predictions that
regulations lower unmeasured home-productivity, driving up housing costs, and with them inferred
land rents and trade-productivity. This variable is not signiﬁcant in the quality-of-life equation,
although regulations might be thought to improve the well-being of households.
The relationships between the natural amenities and productivity, never before estimated, re-
veal interesting patterns. Sunshine, coastal proximity, low levels of cold and low levels of heat
appear to be amenities to ﬁrms as well as households. While the coefﬁcient for coastal proximity
may measure savings in transportation costs, the results for climate are more surprising, although
they could have a psychological basis. For instance, Montesquieu (1748) hypothesized long ago
that extreme temperatures inhibit the ability of humans to work. This is reinforced in engineering
studies that both indoor and outdoor workers are less productive in warm temperatures (Engineer-
ing News Record, 2008). Although the estimates are robust to the latitude control, their magnitudes
in the presence of modern indoor climate control raise questions about their validity. The regres-
sions also suggest that hilly terrain, measured through average slope, is an amenity for households
but a disamenity for ﬁrms, results that seem intuitive.
25As seen through the R-squareds, the parsimonious set of amenities does a remarkably good job
of explaining the observed variation, including 85 percent of trade-productivity, and 90 percent
of land rents and total amenity value. It appears that population, education, sunshine, coastal
proximity, average slope and mild temperatures all have strong associations with high economic
values. Yet, the results also imply that the federal government effectively taxes households for
living in areas that are large, ﬂat, cool, and highly-educated.
5 Conclusion
This paper establishes that researchers are able to infer levels of local productivity in tradeables
from wage and housing-cost data rather accurately if they take into account the cost structure of
housing. Without better data, differences in productivity in non-tradeables are largely impossible
to estimate, and these differences may be important when inferring land rents and the total value of
amenities. The need to investigate home-productivity differences in further research is reinforced
by the signiﬁcance of land-use regulations in the hedonic regressions above.
The model outlined above, is also realistic enough to be sensibly calibrated to describe capi-
talization effects into various factor prices, so that researchers may more accurately measure the
value of amenities, including social investments. The calibration suggests that housing absorbs
about 90 percent of the value of amenities for households and ﬁrms producing tradeables. Wages
reﬂect only a small fraction of quality-of-life differences, but more than 100 percent of trade-
productivity differences. Statistically, variation in both types of amenities are explained rather
well by overall population, education, and a small number of natural amenities. While variations
in overall value across metro areas appear to be inﬂuenced more by productivity, land values ap-
pear to be inﬂuenced more by quality of life because of federal taxes. These taxes cause the price
of land to under-value amenities in trade-productivity and over-value amenities in quality of life
and home-productivity. This raises concerns that local incentives may lead to under-investments
in amenities that improve local productivity, including those that lead to higher population levels
26and agglomeration economies in production.
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32Appendix - Not for Publication
A Quadratic Land-Rent Estimates
The inferred land rent from equation (5) comes from a ﬁrst-order approximation around the na-
tional average. This poses a problem if the cost-shares of land or labor vary substantially across
cities due to variations in factor prices. I address this by taking a second-order approximation of
equation (3) around the national average, and rearranging it to solve for the inaccuracy of the
ﬁrst-order approximation:
^ p   L^ r
j   N ^ w




































Y is the (Allen-Uzawa) partial elasticity of substitution between labor and land, with other
partial elasticities similarly deﬁned. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side captures the substitution




Y = 0, then (A.1) may provide quadratic estimates of land-rent differentials, ^ rj; in terms
of ^ pj and ^ wj. If the elasticities of substitution are less than one, as is likely, then the cost-share
of land increases with land rents. Since the land-share effect depends inversely on the cost-share
of land, the quadratic approximation of ^ rj is concave in ^ pj, as the land-share effect decreases with
^ rj. At the central point where ^ pj = ^ wj = 0, the quadratic and linear approximations formulas are
tangent, and thus the concave quadratic approximation lies below the linear approximation, with
the difference increasing in the square of ^ pj. Therefore, the linear estimates overstate land-rent
differences for ^ pj > 0, and understate differences for ^ pj < 0. Additionally, the cost-share of
labor increases with ^ wj and decreases with ^ rj, causing the need for additional adjustments for the
labor-cost effect.
Appendix ﬁgure A1 illustrates a number of iso-rent curves in both the linear case and the
quadratic case, where NL
Y = KL
Y = NK
Y = 0:67.28 Figure A2 graphs the quadratic land-rent
estimates (numerical values are given in Appendix table A1) using the formula in (A.1) against
the linear land-rent estimates. The quadratic estimates differ most from the linear estimates where
housing costs are furthest from zero. Yet, even at these extremes, they differ by less than 20
percent.29







=(@cY =@w  @cY =@r) is the partial elasticity of substitution between labor and land in
the production of Y , etc. Approximation of the cost-share is
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where the   terms are used to represent average cost shares in the economy. In the case where ^ wj = 0 and LK
Y =
NL
Y = Y , then (A.1) can be arreanged to show ^ rj = ^ pj= L 
 
1    L

(1   Y )
 
^ rj2
. The second term describes
how the quadratic approximation is below the linear approximation when ^ rj 6= 0.
iQuadratic quality-of-life estimates are discussed in the Appendix of Albouy (2008), and are
found to differ little from the corresponding linear estimates.
B Additional Tax Issues
B.1 Deduction
Tax deductions are applied to the consumption of home goods at the rate  2 [0;1], so that the tax
payment is given by (m   py). With the deduction, the mobility condition becomes
^ Q
j = (1   
0)sy^ p









where the tax differential is given by dj=m = 0(sw ^ wj   sypj). This differential can be solved
by noting
sw ^ w




































0 sw ^ w
j
0   sy^ p
j
0
1   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This equation demonstrates that the deduction reduces the dependence of taxes on productivity and
increases the implicit subsidy for quality-of-life.
B.2 State Taxes
The tax differential with state taxes is computed by including an additional component based on
wages and prices relative to the state average, as if state tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum












j   ^ w
S)   Ssy(^ p
j   ^ p
S)]; (A.2)
iiwhere 0
S and S are are marginal tax and deduction rates at the state-level, net of federal deduc-
tions, and ^ wS and ^ pS are the differentials for state S as a whole relative to the entire country.
B.3 Calibration of Tax Parameters
The federal marginal tax rate on wage income is determined by adding together federal marginal
income tax rate and the effective marginal payroll tax rate. TAXSIM gives an average marginal
federal income tax rate of 25.1 percent in 2000. In 2000, Social Security (OASDI) and Medicare
(HI) tax rates were 12.4 and 2.9 percent on employer and employee combined. Estimates from
Boskin et al. (1987, table 4) show that the marginal beneﬁt from future returns from OASDI taxes
is fairly low, generally no more than 50 percent, although only 85 percent of wage earnings are
subject to the OASDI cap. HI taxes emulate a pure tax (Congressional Budget Ofﬁce 2005). These
facts suggest adding 37.5 percent of the Social Security tax and all of the Medicare tax to the
federal income tax rate, adding 8.2 percent. The employer-half of the payroll tax (4.1 percent)
has to be added to observed wage levels to produce gross wage levels. Overall, this puts an overall
federal tax rate, 0 , of 33.3-percent on gross wages, although only 29.2 percent on observed wages.
Determining the federal deduction level requires taking into account the fact that many house-
holds do not itemize deductions. According to the Statistics on Income, although only 33 percent
of tax returns itemize, they account for 67 percent of reported Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). Since
the income-weighted share is what matters, 67 percent is multiplied by the effective tax reduction
given in TAXSIM, in 2000 of 21.6 percent. Thus, on average these deductions reduce the effective
price of eligible goods by 14.5 percent. Since eligible goods only include housing, this deduction
applies to only 59 percent of home goods. Multiplying 14.5 percent by 59 percent, gives an effec-
tive price reduction of 8.6 percent for home goods. Divided by a federal tax rate of 33.3 percent,
this produces a federal deduction level of 25.7 percent.
State income tax rates from 2000 are taken from TAXSIM, which, per dollar, fall at an average
marginal rate of 4.5 percent. State sales tax data in 2000 are taken from the Tax Policy Center,
originally supplied by the Federation of Tax Administrators. The average state sales tax rate is 5.2
percent. Sales tax rates are reduced by 10 percent to accommodate untaxed goods and services
other than food or housing (Feenberg et al. 1997), and by another 8 percent in states that exempt
food. Overall state taxes raise the marginal tax rate on wage differences within-state by an average
of 5.9 percentage points, from zero points in Alaska to 8.8 points in Minnesota.
State-level deductions for housing expenditures, explicit in income taxes, and implicit in sales
taxes, should also be included. At the state level, deductions for income taxes are calculated in an
equivalent way using TAXSIM data. Furthermore, all housing expenditures are deducted from the
sales tax. Overall this produces an average effective deduction level of  = 0:291:
C Data and Estimation
Wage and housing-price data come from the United States Census data from the 2000 Integrated
Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), from Ruggles et al. (2004). The wage sample is for work-
ers ages 25 to 55, who report working at least 30 hours a week, 26 weeks a year. Place of residence
determines the the MSA assigned to a worker, rather than their place of work. Below is a list of the
controls used in the wage equation:
iii 12 indicators of educational attainment;
 a quartic in potential experience, and potential experience interacted with years of education;
 9 indicators of industry at the one-digit level (1950 classiﬁcation);
 9 indicators of employment at the one-digit level (1950 classiﬁcation);
 4 indicators of marital status (married, divorced, widowed, separated);
 an indicator for veteran status, and veteran status interacted with age;
 5 indicators of minority status (Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and other);
 an indicator of immigrant status, years since immigration, and immigrant status interacted
with black, Hispanic, Asian, and other; and
 2 indicators for English proﬁciency (none or poor).
All covariates are interacted with gender.
I ﬁrst run the regression using census-person weights. From the regressions, I calculate a
predicted wage is using the individual characteristics, not the MSAs, to form a new weight equal to
the predicted wage multiplied by the census-person weight. Economically, these income-adjusted
weights are more relevant since workers’ inﬂuence on prices is determined by their endowment
and income share (see Section D.3 below). The new weights are then used in a second regression,
which is used to calculate the city-wage differentials from the MSA indicator variables. In practice,
this weighting procedure has only a small effect on the estimated wage differentials.
Below is a list of the controls used in the housing-cost regression:
 9 indicators of building size;
 9 indicators for the number of rooms, 5 indicators for the number of bedrooms, number
of rooms interacted with number of bedrooms, and the number of household members per
room;
 2 indicators for lot size;
 7 indicators for when the building was built;
 2 indicators for complete plumbing and kitchen facilities;
 an indicator for commercial use; and
 an indicator for condominium status (owned units only).
I ﬁrst run a regression of housing values on housing characteristics and MSA indicator variables
using only owner-occupied units, weighting by census-housing weights. From this regression, I
calculate a new value-adjusted weight by multiplying the census-housing weights by the predicted
value from this ﬁrst regression using housing characteristics alone. Economically, these weights
reﬂect the number of efﬁciency units of housing that observation provides. I then run a second
ivregression with these new weights for all units, rented and owner-occupied, on the housing char-
acteristics fully interacted with tenure, along with the MSA indicators, which are not interacted.
I take the house-price differentials from the MSA indicator variables in this second regression.
As with the wage differentials, this adjusted weighting method has only a small impact on the
measured price differentials.
D Additional Theoretical Details
D.1 System of Equations
The entire system consists of fourteen equations in fourteen unknowns, with three exogenous pa-
rameters: Q;AX, and;AY, with superscripts j supressed. The ﬁrst three equations (1), (2), and (3)
determine the prices of land, labor, and the home good, r;w and p. With these prices given, the
budget constraint and the consumption tangency condition determine the consumption quantities
x and y,
x + py = w + R + I   (w) (A.3)
(@U=@y)=(@U=@x) = p (A.4)
whereR and I are given. Changes in output (X;Y ), employment (NX;NY;N), capital (KX;KY),
and land use (LX;LY) are determined by nine equations in the production sector: six statements
of Shepard’s Lemma
@cX=@w = NX=X; @cX=@r = LX=X; @cX=@i = KX=X (A.5)
@NY=@w = NY=Y; @cY=@r = LY=Y; @cY=@i = KY=Y (A.6)
and three equations for total population, the land constraint, and total home-good production per
capita
NX + NY = N (A.7)
LX + LY = L(r) (A.8)
Y = yN (A.9)
D.2 Quantity Changes
D.2.1 Consumption
The budget constraint (A.3) and tangency condition (A.4) can be log-linearized to yield




^ x   ^ y = D^ p (A.11)
vSubtracting (4a) from (A.10), sx^ x + sy^ y =   ^ Q and substituting in (A.11) yields
^ y =  sxD^ p   ^ Q (A.12)











and so we can see that home-
good consumption is decreasing in both productivity and quality of life.

















In the production sector, differentiating and log-linearizing the Shepard’s Lemma conditions (A.5)
and (A.6) gives six equations of the following form
^ NX = ^ X   ^ AX + L
LN
X (^ r   ^ w) + K
NK
X (^ {   ^ w) (A.13)
These expressions make use of partial (Allen-Uzawa) elasticities of substitution, of which each
sector has three for each combination of two factors, where LN
X  (@2c=@w@r)=(@c=@w  @c=@r)
is the partial elasticity of substitution between labor and land in the production of X, etc. Because
productivity differences are Hicks-neutral, they do not inﬂuence these elasticities of substitution.
Log-linearizing the constraints (A.7), (A.8), and (A.9)
N ^ NX + (1   N) ^ NY = ^ N
L^ LX + (1   L)^ LY = "L;r
^ N + ^ y = ^ Y
Substituting in (4b), (4c), and (A.12), setting ^ AY = 0, and rearranging gives a system of nine




Y, as in CES production, then these equations take on the matrix form below:
2
6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6
4
1 0 0  1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0  1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1  1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0  1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0  1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1  1 0
N 0 0 0 1   N 0 0 0  1
0 L 0 0 0 1   L 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  1
3
7 7
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7 7 7 7
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4
(X   1) ^ AX   X ^ w
(X   1) ^ AX   X^ r
(X   1) ^ AX
(Y   1) ^ AY + Y (^ p   ^ w)
(Y   1) ^ AY + Y (^ p   ^ r)
(Y   1) ^ AY + Y ^ p
0
"L;r
 sxD^ p   ^ Q
3
7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7
5
viThe quantities on the right-hand side of the equation are already derived from the observed data.
The solution for ^ N is given by






^ p + (N   L) ^ Q + LX (^ r   ^ w)
+ Y















+ (1   Y)(N   L) ^ AY
Note that ^ p; ^ w, and ^ r, are determined by ^ Q, and ^ AX and ^ AY, according to the capitalization
formulas in Section 2.6.
According to the calibrated model where D = Y = X = 0:667; the numerical solution to
this equation is simply.
^ N = 8:06 ^ Q + 2:08 ^ AX + "L;r^ r
According to table 3, the standard deviations of ^ Q and ^ AX are 0:051 and 0:155: multiplied by the
respective coefﬁcients in the equation produces 0.414 and 0.324. This suggests that both quality of
life and productivity are important determinants of population location decisions, although quality-
of-life may be slightly more important. This is remarkably similar to the results for land rents.
If increases in land supply through "L;r are proportional to increases in land rents, this would
reinforce the conclusion that quality of life is slightly more important in accounting for location
decisions.
D.3 Multiple Household Types
For simplicity, ignore federal taxes and assume there are two types of fully mobile households,
referred to as "a" and "b." The most interesting case is when some members of each type live in
every city. The mobility conditions for each type are
ea(p;wa;u;Qa) = 0
eb(p;wb;u;Qb) = 0
I generalize the two zero-proﬁt conditions with unit-cost functions that have factor-speciﬁc pro-
ductivity components.
cX(wa=AXa;wb=AXb;r=AXL; {=AXL) = 1
cY(wa=AY a;wb=AY b;r=AY L; {=AY K) = p
The terms AXa and AXb give the relative productivity of each worker type in the city. Log-
linearizing these equations:
sya^ p   swa ^ wa = ^ Qa
syb^ p   swb ^ wb = ^ Qb
Na ^ wa + Nb ^ wb + L^ r = ^ AX
Na ^ wa + Nb ^ wb + L^ r = ^ AY
viiwhere  denotes the cost-shares of each factor, and a ^ AXa+b ^ AXb+L ^ AXL+K ^ AXK  ^ AX and
a ^ AY a +b ^ AY b +L ^ AY L +K ^ AY K  ^ AY. The additivity of these effects proves that differences
in productivity have the same ﬁrst-order effects on prices regardless of the factor they augment
directly when weighted by the cost-share of that factor.30
Let the share of total income accruing to type a worker be a = Nama=(Nama + Nbmb),
with the other share b = 1   a, and deﬁne the following income-weighted averages
sy  asya + bsyb; sx  1   sy; &y  asya=sy
^ Q  a ^ Qa + b ^ Qb; sw  aswa + bswb; ^ w  a
swa
sw














Then it is possible to show that the following capitalization formulas hold.
sR^ r = ^ Q + sx ^ AX + sy ^ AY
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Except for the terms in square brackets, ”[]”, these terms are otherwise identical to equations (7)
without taxes. The bracketed term explains that wage and housing-cost differences increase in the
quality-of-life of the labor type that is relatively more represented in the traded-good sector, or
decreasing in the quality-of-life of the labor type more represented in the home-good sector. The
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The model assumes that both types of households live in each city. This assumption is easier to
maintain if the type of labor they supply are imperfect substitutes in production.
Factor-speciﬁc productivity differences do have ﬁrst-order effects on quantities in the model.
For example, in the case where partial elasticities of substitution across factors within sectors are
equal, the relative employment of a-types relative to b-types is
^ Na   ^ Nb =  X (^ wa   ^ wb) + (X   1)

^ AXa   ^ AXb

30This is more general than the models seen in Roback (1988) and Beeson (1991), who assume swa = swb = 1 and
L = 1.
viiiD.4 Multiple Home Goods
Suppose now that there is one type of household but two types of goods, 1 and 2, such as residential
housing and local services. The four equilibrium conditions, using obvious deﬁnitions, are written
e(p1;p2;u)=Q = m
cX(w;r; {)=AX = 1
cY 1(w;r; {)=AY 1 = p1
cY 2(w;r; {)=AY 2 = p2
Log-linearizing these equations produces
sy1^ p1 + sy2^ p2   sw ^ w = ^ Q
N ^ w + L^ r = ^ AX
N1 ^ w + L1^ r   ^ p1 = ^ AY 1
N2 ^ w + L2^ r   ^ p2 = ^ AY 2
If we deﬁne an aggregate shares, prices, and home-productivity appropriately
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then the main results generalize:
sR^ r = ^ Q + sx ^ AX + sy ^ AY




















Now a question is whether using a local price index based on only one home-good price, e.g. the
one for residential housing, ^ p1, may be biased relative to using a more balanced local price index,
ix^ p.31 Weighted by the relevant total expenditure share, the bias is given by
sy(^ p1   ^ p) =
N (1   L)(L1=L   1)   L (1   N)(N1=N   1)
N






[N (L1=L   1) + (1   N)(N1=N   1)]sx ^ AX
+








sy1 ^ AY 1
If the cost structure of both home goods are the same, i.e., if L1 = L and N1 = N, then this
collapses to  (sy   sy1) ^ AY 1, i.e., the price index will be biased towards how productive the city
is in producing the ﬁrst home good. When the ﬁrst home good is more land intensive and less
labor intensive than the second, i.e. if L1 > L and N1 < N2 then an index based on the ﬁrst
home good will more strongly capitalize differences in ^ AX. In this case, the ﬁrst good will also
more strongly capitalize differences in ^ Q; ^ AY 1, and ^ AY 2 so long as (1=L   1)(L1=L   1) >
(1=N   1)(N1=N   1), which should generally be the case as L is much smaller than N. In
the extreme case, where the second good has the same factor proportions as the tradable good, i.e.,
L2 = L and N2 = N, its price only capitalizes differences in its own productivity as ^ p2 = ^ AY 2,
and the ﬁrst good does all of the capitalization.
The distinction between home goods and tradable goods is somewhat artiﬁcial, as most goods
are a mixture of both, with the key distinction being how land and labor-intensive the goods are.
The broader the deﬁnition of home goods, the larger is the effective share sy, but the closer the
cost shares L and N are to L and N. The capitalization effects on land are unchanged so long
as sR remains the same. The capitalization of Q and AY will also be the same, so long as the ratio
L=N remains constant. The only capitalization effect that changes substantially are those for
AX in wages and prices, as (1   L)=N must get larger as the deﬁnition of home goods expands,
increasing the capitalization effect of trade-productive amenities.
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Panel A: Federal Taxes Geographically Neutral
Land Rents 1.00 1.00 1.00
Wages -0.23 1.19 -0.23
Home-Good Prices 0.77 1.19 -0.23
Panel B: With Federal Income Taxes
Land Rents: 1.19 0.63 1.07
Wages -0.27 1.28 -0.24
TABLE 2: PREDICTED EFFECT OF AMENITIES ON THE VALUE OF LAND 
RENTS, WAGES, AND HOME-GOOD PRICES
Increase in Value from a One-Dollar Increase in 
Amenity Value
ˆ j


















Home-Good Prices 0.92 0.90 -0.17
Federal Tax Payment -0.19 0.37 -0.07
Panel C: Elasticities of Prices to Attributes, under Federal Income Taxes
Land Rents: 11.85 4.01 3.86
Wages -0.36 1.09 -0.12
Home-Good Prices 2.54 1.61 -0.17
Federal Tax Payment -0.19 0.24 -0.03
Total Value  1.00 0.64 -0.07
Panel A is based on formulas in (7) using s R = 0.10, s w  = 0.75, s x = 0.64, s y = 0.36, λ L = 
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Main city in MSA/CMSA
San Francisco CA 7,039,362 0.26 0.81 2.78 0.14 0.29 0.05 0.32
Santa Barbara CA 399,347 0.07 0.66 2.65 0.18 0.13 -0.01 0.26
Honolulu HI 876,156 -0.01 0.61 2.62 0.20 0.06 -0.02 0.24
Monterey CA 401,762 0.10 0.59 2.24 0.14 0.14 0.01 0.23
San Diego CA 2,813,833 0.06 0.48 1.89 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.19
Los Angeles CA 16,373,645 0.13 0.45 1.57 0.08 0.15 0.02 0.18
New York NY 21,199,865 0.21 0.41 1.18 0.03 0.21 0.04 0.16
Seattle WA 3,554,760 0.08 0.31 1.10 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.12
Boston MA 5,819,100 0.12 0.29 0.93 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.12
Denver CO 2,581,506 0.05 0.24 0.89 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.10
Chicago IL 9,157,540 0.14 0.22 0.59 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.09
Portland OR 2,265,223 0.02 0.17 0.68 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.07
Washington-Baltimore DC 7,608,070 0.13 0.15 0.31 -0.01 0.12 0.03 0.06
Miami FL 3,876,380 0.00 0.13 0.54 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05
Phoenix AZ 3,251,876 0.03 0.08 0.24 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03
Detroit MI 5,456,428 0.13 0.05 -0.13 -0.05 0.11 0.04 0.02
Philadelphia PA 6,188,463 0.11 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.10 0.03 0.02
Minneapolis MN 2,968,806 0.08 0.02 -0.14 -0.03 0.07 0.03 0.01
Atlanta GA 4,112,198 0.08 0.01 -0.15 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01
Cleveland OH 2,945,831 0.01 -0.03 -0.17 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01
Dallas TX 5,221,801 0.06 -0.04 -0.34 -0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.01
Tampa FL 2,395,997 -0.06 -0.08 -0.20 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03
St. Louis MO 2,603,607 0.01 -0.10 -0.46 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.04
Houston TX 4,669,571 0.07 -0.11 -0.68 -0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.04
Pittsburgh PA 2,358,695 -0.04 -0.21 -0.77 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.08
San Antonio TX 1,592,383 -0.09 -0.25 -0.85 -0.04 -0.10 -0.02 -0.10
Oklahoma City OK 1,083,346 -0.13 -0.28 -0.83 -0.02 -0.14 -0.02 -0.11
McAllen TX 569,463 -0.21 -0.57 -1.86 -0.08 -0.23 -0.04 -0.23
Census Division
Pacific 45,025,637 0.10 0.39 1.42 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.16
New England 13,922,517 0.07 0.19 0.61 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.07
Middle Atlantic 39,671,861 0.09 0.13 0.28 -0.01 0.09 0.02 0.05
Mountain 18,172,295 -0.06 0.00 0.16 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.00
East North Central 45,155,037 0.02 -0.07 -0.33 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.03
South Atlantic 51,769,160 -0.04 -0.08 -0.25 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03
West South Central 31,444,850 -0.08 -0.24 -0.83 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.10
West North Central 19,237,739 -0.11 -0.25 -0.80 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.10
East South Central 17,022,810 -0.12 -0.32 -1.02 -0.04 -0.13 -0.02 -0.12
MSA Population
MSA, Pop > 5 Million 84,064,274 0.16 0.32 0.96 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.13
MSA, Pop 1.5-4.9 Million 57,157,386 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02
MSA, Pop 0.5-1.4 Million 42,435,508 -0.03 -0.09 -0.29 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04
MSA, Pop < 0.5 Million 42,324,511 -0.10 -0.19 -0.52 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.07
Non-MSA areas 55,440,227 -0.16 -0.32 -0.91 -0.02 -0.16 -0.04 -0.13
United States  281,421,906 0.13 0.30 1.00 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.12
total
TABLE 3: WAGE, HOUSING COST, LAND RENT, QUALITY-OF-LIFE, PRODUCTIVITY, FEDERAL TAX, AND TOTAL AMENITY VALUE 
DIFFERENTIALS, 2000
Adjusted Differentials
Wage and housing price data are taken from the U.S. Census 2000 IPUMS. Wage differentials are based on the average logarithm of hourly wages for
full-time workers ages 25 to 55. Housing price differentials based on the average logarithm of rents and housing prices for units moved in within the last
10 years. Adjusted differentials are city-fixed effects from individual level regressions on extended sets of worker and housing covariates. The inferred
land-rent, quality-of-life, trade-productivity, and total-amenity variables are estimated from equations (11) in the text, with some additional adjustements







DifferentialVariance Quality-of-Life Productivity Covariance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: With Federal Taxes
Land Rents 1.002 0.370 0.287 0.342
Wages 0.019 0.018 1.132 -0.150
Housing Costs 0.093 0.184 0.498 0.318
Tax Differential 0.001 0.113 1.276 -0.398
Total Value 0.015 0.181 0.503 0.317
Panel B: Federal Taxes Geographically Neutral
Land Rents 1.459 0.181 0.503 0.317
Wages 0.017 0.015 1.120 -0.134
Housing Costs 0.126 0.097 0.642 0.262
Tax Differential 0.000 . . .
Total Value 0.015 0.181 0.503 0.317
TABLE 4:  VARIANCE DECOMPOSTION OF QUALITY-OF-LIFE AND PRODUCTIVITY 
EFFECTS ON PRICE DIFFERENTIALS ACROSS CITIES
Variance Decomposition
The variance is calculated across 274 metro areas and 49 non-metro areas by state, weighted by 
population.
Fraction of variance explained byTotal
Standard Housing Quality Trade Local Federal Amenity
Mean Deviation Cost Wage of Life Productivity Land Rents Tax Payment Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Logarithm of Population 14.63 1.32 0.059*** 0.041*** -0.001 0.038*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Percent of Population 0.26 0.07 1.562*** 0.672*** 0.184*** 0.698*** 0.485*** 0.146*** 0.631*** 
 College Graduates (0.161) (0.069) (0.040) (0.067) (0.058) (0.017) (0.064)
Whartron Residential Land-Use  0.05 0.93 0.030** 0.015** 0.002 0.015** 0.009* 0.003 0.012**
Regulatory Index (WRLURI) (0.013) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Minus Heating-Degree Days -4.38 2.15 0.062*** 0.023*** 0.009** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.004*** 0.025*** 
 (1000s) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Minus Cooling-Degree Days  -1.28 0.89 0.123*** 0.023* 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.046*** 0.001 0.048***
(1000s) (0.019) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
Sunshine 0.60 0.08 0.995*** 0.188** 0.232*** 0.255*** 0.375*** 0.021 0.395***
(percent possible) (0.127) (0.093) (0.040) (0.083) (0.044) (0.024) (0.051)
Inverse Distance to Coast 0.04 0.04 1.883*** 0.387*** 0.409*** 0.507*** 0.701*** 0.033 0.734*** 
(Ocean or Great Lake) (0.236) (0.132) (0.056) (0.124) (0.080) (0.032) (0.094)
Average Slope of Land 1.68 1.59 0.016*** -0.009*** 0.010*** -0.005* 0.009*** -0.003*** 0.006***
(percent) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Latitude 37.76 4.86 0.014*** 0.010** 0.000 0.009*** 0.003** 0.002** 0.006*** 
(degrees) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant -1.543 -0.749 -0.132 -0.757 -0.455 -0.161 -0.616
(0.163) (0.101) (0.045) (0.092) (0.057) (0.025) (0.064)
R-squared 0.91 0.82 0.77 0.85 0.90 0.76 0.91
282 observations with complete data. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions weighted by the sum of individuals in a city,
each according to their predicted income in an average city. Amenity variables are described in Section 4.1.
Observables Amenity Type
TABLE 5: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPECIFIC AMENITIES AND HOUSING COSTS, WAGES, QUALITY OF LIFE, PRODUCTIVITY, LAND RENTS, 

















































































Avg Mobility Cond: slope = 1.54
Avg Zero-Profit Cond: slope = -7.37
Avg Iso-Rent Curve: slope = .62








Unadjusted Avg Mobility Cond: slope = 4
Unadjusted Avg Zero-Profit Cond: slope = -33
Unadjusted Avg Iso-Rent Curve: slope = 0
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-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Log Wage Differential
METRO POP >5.0 Million Avg Iso-Rent Curve: slope = .64
1.5-5.0 Million 0.5-1.5 Million Avg Mobility Cond: slope = 1.53
<0.5 Million Non-Metro Areas Avg Zero-Profit Cond: slope = -7.37
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-0.234 -0.156 -0.078 0.000 0.078 0.156 0.234
Relative Productivity (Ax)
METRO POP >5.0 Million Iso-Wage Curve: slope = 3.04
1.5-5.0 Million 0.5-1.5 Million Iso-Housing-Cost Curve: slope = -.63
<0.5 Million Non-Metro Areas Iso-Land-Rent Curve: slope = -.34
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Figure 7: Total Value of Amenities and Population SizeFull Name of Metropolitan Area Population Wages
Housing 
Costs Linear Quadratic Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
  San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA 7,039,362 0.256 0.813 2.780 2.246 0.138 3 0.289 1 0.045 0.323 1
  Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 399,347 0.068 0.662 2.651 2.111 0.176 2 0.125 7 -0.010 0.255 2
 Honolulu,  HI 876,156 -0.010 0.605 2.620 2.069 0.204 1 0.057 22 -0.022 0.240 3
  Salinas (Monterey-Carmel), CA 401,762 0.103 0.590 2.244 1.847 0.137 4 0.144 4 0.005 0.229 4
  San Diego, CA 2,813,833 0.058 0.479 1.894 1.590 0.123 7 0.098 11 -0.004 0.185 5
  Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA 16,373,645 0.129 0.450 1.573 1.369 0.081 14 0.150 3 0.020 0.177 6
  San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 246,681 0.036 0.452 1.840 1.546 0.124 6 0.077 16 -0.011 0.173 7
  New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA 21,199,864 0.209 0.411 1.184 1.077 0.029 51 0.209 2 0.044 0.163 8
  Barnstable-Yarmouth (Cape Cod), MA 162,582 0.005 0.395 1.678 1.422 0.121 8 0.046 26 -0.017 0.151 9
 Non-metro,  HI 335,381 -0.029 0.332 1.504 1.285 0.126 0.013 -0.016 0.135
 Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton,  WA 3,554,760 0.078 0.308 1.103 0.992 0.061 22 0.095 13 0.011 0.121 10
 Boston-Worcester-Lawrence,  MA-NH-ME-CT 5,819,100 0.123 0.294 0.925 0.851 0.034 46 0.128 6 0.024 0.116 11
  Santa Fe, NM 147,635 -0.060 0.290 1.408 1.206 0.127 5 -0.017 60 -0.025 0.116 12
 Naples,  FL 251,377 -0.004 0.286 1.239 1.087 0.095 11 0.027 34 -0.011 0.113 13
 Denver-Boulder-Greeley,  CO 2,581,506 0.051 0.240 0.888 0.812 0.054 26 0.066 19 0.008 0.097 14
 Chicago-Gary-Kenosha,  IL-IN-WI 9,157,540 0.136 0.224 0.585 0.558 0.005 80 0.131 5 0.030 0.089 15
 Non-metro,  RI 61,968 0.060 0.215 0.757 0.703 0.040 0.071 0.009 0.085
 Sacramento-Yolo,  CA 1,796,857 0.067 0.206 0.699 0.653 0.033 48 0.075 17 0.011 0.081 16
 Reno,  NV 339,486 0.027 0.210 0.826 0.757 0.053 30 0.043 29 -0.002 0.081 17
 Anchorage,  AK 260,283 0.073 0.185 0.595 0.562 0.023 59 0.077 15 0.013 0.073 18
 Portland-Salem,  OR-WA 2,265,223 0.024 0.174 0.680 0.632 0.047 37 0.037 30 0.003 0.071 19
 Washington-Baltimore,  DC-MD-VA-WV 7,608,070 0.126 0.154 0.314 0.307 -0.013 122 0.116 9 0.030 0.062 20
  Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 251,494 -0.061 0.150 0.808 0.730 0.079 16 -0.032 72 -0.022 0.059 21
 Non-metro,  CO 693,605 -0.137 0.137 0.962 0.843 0.112 -0.094 -0.044 0.052
 Stockton-Lodi,  CA 563,598 0.088 0.126 0.296 0.289 -0.002 93 0.083 14 0.021 0.051 22
 Hartford,  CT 1,183,110 0.134 0.133 0.201 0.198 -0.026 155 0.120 8 0.030 0.050 23
  Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL 3,876,380 0.001 0.126 0.535 0.503 0.041 39 0.015 39 -0.003 0.050 24
 Bellingham,  WA 166,814 -0.065 0.127 0.726 0.660 0.074 17 -0.038 82 -0.023 0.050 25
 Non-metro,  CA 1,121,254 -0.040 0.134 0.686 0.630 0.059 -0.017 -0.021 0.048
  West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 1,131,184 0.042 0.115 0.378 0.364 0.017 66 0.046 27 0.009 0.047 26
 Non-metro,  CT 148,665 0.083 0.119 0.285 0.279 -0.007 0.078 0.015 0.043
 Madison,  WI 426,526 -0.038 0.110 0.574 0.533 0.053 28 -0.018 63 -0.016 0.042 27
  New London-Norwich, CT-RI 293,566 0.050 0.110 0.332 0.321 0.006 79 0.051 23 0.006 0.039 28
 Sarasota-Bradenton,  FL 589,959 -0.071 0.094 0.595 0.548 0.066 19 -0.046 85 -0.023 0.037 29
 Non-metro,  MA 247,672 -0.068 0.108 0.652 0.597 0.063 -0.042 -0.029 0.036
 Non-metro,  AK 366,649 0.035 0.090 0.292 0.283 0.012 0.037 0.006 0.035
 Eugene-Springfield,  OR 322,959 -0.118 0.091 0.716 0.644 0.088 13 -0.084 127 -0.037 0.035 30
 Medford-Ashland,  OR 181,269 -0.136 0.084 0.736 0.658 0.095 12 -0.099 147 -0.042 0.031 31
 Phoenix-Mesa,  AZ 3,251,876 0.028 0.075 0.243 0.237 0.012 72 0.030 32 0.007 0.031 32
 Corvalis,  OR 78,153 -0.113 0.076 0.634 0.575 0.081 15 -0.081 122 -0.035 0.029 33
  Grand Junction, CO 116,255 -0.180 0.079 0.833 0.731 0.114 9 -0.134 200 -0.055 0.029 34
  Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 1,188,613 0.018 0.073 0.262 0.255 0.014 69 0.022 35 0.002 0.028 35
  Austin-San Marcos, TX 1,249,763 0.009 0.067 0.264 0.256 0.016 67 0.014 40 -0.001 0.026 36
 Modesto,  CA 446,997 0.056 0.059 0.098 0.098 -0.008 106 0.050 24 0.014 0.024 37
  Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI 5,456,428 0.130 0.053 -0.130 -0.139 -0.047 215 0.108 10 0.035 0.022 38
  Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 1,187,941 0.016 0.044 0.143 0.141 0.011 74 0.018 38 0.008 0.022 39
  Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD 6,188,463 0.114 0.052 -0.090 -0.096 -0.040 192 0.096 12 0.030 0.021 40
APPENDIX TABLE A1: LIST OF METROPOLITAN AND NON-METROPOLITAN AREAS RANKED BY TOTAL AMENITY VALUE






DifferentialFull Name of Metropolitan Area Population Wages
Housing 
Costs Linear Quadratic Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
APPENDIX TABLE A1: LIST OF METROPOLITAN AND NON-METROPOLITAN AREAS RANKED BY TOTAL AMENITY VALUE







  Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 1,333,914 -0.024 0.038 0.226 0.219 0.026 55 -0.015 57 -0.006 0.017 41
 Milwaukee-Racine,  WI 1,689,572 0.043 0.032 0.018 0.017 -0.009 107 0.037 31 0.013 0.015 42
  Colorado Springs, CO 516,929 -0.088 0.033 0.384 0.360 0.055 25 -0.066 103 -0.025 0.013 43
 Portland,  ME 243,537 -0.078 0.019 0.299 0.283 0.051 33 -0.060 97 -0.017 0.013 44
 Burlington,  VT 169,391 -0.107 0.021 0.386 0.359 0.065 20 -0.082 125 -0.026 0.013 45
  Las Vegas, NV-AZ 1,563,282 0.068 0.029 -0.065 -0.067 -0.025 150 0.057 21 0.018 0.011 46
  Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 2,968,806 0.082 0.020 -0.142 -0.149 -0.032 171 0.067 18 0.026 0.011 47
 Chico-Paradise,  CA 203,171 -0.090 0.043 0.432 0.402 0.053 29 -0.067 104 -0.033 0.010 48
 Albuquerque,  NM 712,738 -0.082 0.013 0.282 0.267 0.049 34 -0.064 100 -0.020 0.008 49
 Atlanta,  GA 4,112,198 0.078 0.014 -0.154 -0.161 -0.032 174 0.063 20 0.024 0.008 50
 Wilmington,  NC 233,450 -0.134 0.017 0.441 0.405 0.071 18 -0.104 155 -0.039 0.005 51
 Springfield,  MA 591,932 -0.006 0.009 0.055 0.055 0.002 87 -0.003 48 -0.005 0.000 52
 Charlottesville,  VA 159,576 -0.113 -0.003 0.300 0.281 0.054 27 -0.090 136 -0.034 -0.004 53
  Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 440,888 -0.105 -0.014 0.228 0.215 0.049 36 -0.084 129 -0.028 -0.005 54
 Non-metro,  WA 994,967 -0.083 -0.014 0.170 0.162 0.037 -0.067 -0.022 -0.005
 Redding,  CA 163,256 -0.094 0.001 0.263 0.248 0.041 38 -0.074 110 -0.032 -0.006 55
 Tucson,  AZ 843,746 -0.114 -0.010 0.268 0.252 0.052 31 -0.091 139 -0.033 -0.006 56
 Non-metro,  NV 250,521 0.008 -0.017 -0.097 -0.099 -0.011 0.005 0.002 -0.008
  Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 1,499,293 0.013 -0.033 -0.177 -0.182 -0.013 123 0.007 43 0.009 -0.008 57
 Non-metro,  NH 496,087 -0.100 -0.030 0.147 0.140 0.042 -0.082 -0.025 -0.010
 Non-metro,  OR 919,033 -0.140 -0.024 0.284 0.264 0.062 -0.113 -0.039 -0.011
 Nashville,  TN 1,231,311 -0.016 -0.030 -0.086 -0.086 -0.001 90 -0.016 59 -0.003 -0.011 58
 Provo-Orem,  UT 368,536 -0.056 -0.030 0.024 0.024 0.019 64 -0.048 87 -0.014 -0.011 59
  Iowa City, IA 111,006 -0.087 -0.032 0.105 0.101 0.034 45 -0.072 109 -0.022 -0.012 60
 Cleveland-Akron,  OH 2,945,831 0.012 -0.032 -0.171 -0.176 -0.016 127 0.006 44 0.005 -0.012 61
  Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 5,221,801 0.064 -0.037 -0.338 -0.360 -0.044 205 0.047 25 0.019 -0.014 62
 Fresno,  CA 922,516 -0.012 -0.039 -0.133 -0.135 -0.008 104 -0.014 56 -0.004 -0.017 63
 Orlando,  FL 1,644,561 -0.040 -0.046 -0.088 -0.088 0.006 78 -0.037 79 -0.008 -0.017 64
 Pittsfield,  MA 84,699 -0.058 -0.033 0.021 0.020 0.014 70 -0.050 89 -0.020 -0.018 65
 Columbus,  OH 1,540,157 0.023 -0.054 -0.296 -0.310 -0.028 159 0.013 41 0.009 -0.020 66
 Merced,  CA 210,554 -0.010 -0.048 -0.180 -0.184 -0.012 121 -0.013 55 -0.002 -0.020 67
 Lancaster,  PA 470,658 -0.015 -0.053 -0.188 -0.192 -0.011 117 -0.017 61 -0.003 -0.022 68
  Green Bay, WI 226,778 -0.019 -0.064 -0.223 -0.229 -0.011 116 -0.022 66 -0.002 -0.025 69
 Cincinnati-Hamilton,  OH-KY-IN 1,979,202 0.035 -0.070 -0.394 -0.420 -0.038 186 0.020 37 0.014 -0.025 70
 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton,  PA 637,958 0.002 -0.064 -0.280 -0.291 -0.022 141 -0.005 49 0.002 -0.026 71
 Asheville,  NC 225,965 -0.159 -0.060 0.181 0.167 0.058 23 -0.132 197 -0.044 -0.026 72
 Yakima,  WA 222,581 -0.027 -0.072 -0.236 -0.242 -0.009 108 -0.029 70 -0.004 -0.027 73
  Charleston-North Charleston, SC 549,033 -0.095 -0.069 -0.036 -0.037 0.025 57 -0.082 123 -0.024 -0.028 74
 Non-metro,  VT 439,436 -0.197 -0.086 0.173 0.157 0.073 -0.165 -0.050 -0.032
  Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 2,395,997 -0.057 -0.084 -0.204 -0.208 0.003 86 -0.054 94 -0.012 -0.032 75
 Missoula,  MT 95,802 -0.251 -0.090 0.306 0.271 0.101 10 -0.208 260 -0.063 -0.033 76
  Yuba City, CA 139,149 -0.073 -0.074 -0.115 -0.116 0.009 76 -0.066 102 -0.022 -0.034 77
  Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- 1,569,541 -0.109 -0.081 -0.045 -0.047 0.027 53 -0.095 141 -0.029 -0.034 78
 Non-metro,  DE 156,638 -0.081 -0.088 -0.155 -0.157 0.010 -0.073 -0.021 -0.037
  New Orleans, LA 1,337,726 -0.070 -0.097 -0.224 -0.228 0.005 81 -0.065 101 -0.015 -0.037 79
 Indianapolis,  IN 1,607,486 0.017 -0.096 -0.459 -0.492 -0.039 189 0.003 45 0.009 -0.037 80
 Richmond-Petersburg,  VA 996,512 0.006 -0.098 -0.437 -0.466 -0.033 178 -0.006 50 0.006 -0.037 81Full Name of Metropolitan Area Population Wages
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  St. Louis, MO-IL 2,603,607 0.005 -0.104 -0.458 -0.489 -0.034 180 -0.007 51 0.008 -0.038 82
 Bloomington,  IN 120,563 -0.127 -0.090 -0.036 -0.038 0.032 49 -0.110 166 -0.035 -0.038 83
  Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 319,426 -0.085 -0.100 -0.197 -0.200 0.011 73 -0.078 113 -0.019 -0.039 84
  Boise City, ID 432,345 -0.083 -0.109 -0.239 -0.243 0.010 75 -0.077 112 -0.015 -0.039 85
 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville,  CA 368,021 -0.032 -0.094 -0.315 -0.326 -0.016 130 -0.036 77 -0.008 -0.039 86
  State College, PA 135,758 -0.139 -0.092 -0.010 -0.014 0.036 43 -0.120 173 -0.039 -0.040 87
 Tallahassee,  FL 284,539 -0.110 -0.106 -0.150 -0.152 0.022 61 -0.098 145 -0.026 -0.041 88
 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle,  PA 629,401 -0.011 -0.105 -0.420 -0.444 -0.029 162 -0.020 65 0.000 -0.042 89
 Jacksonville,  FL 1,100,491 -0.050 -0.110 -0.333 -0.345 -0.009 110 -0.051 90 -0.009 -0.042 90
  Punta Gorda, FL 141,627 -0.167 -0.108 -0.006 -0.011 0.049 35 -0.143 212 -0.042 -0.043 91
 Houston-Galveston-Brazoria,  TX 4,669,571 0.073 -0.111 -0.675 -0.762 -0.072 267 0.045 28 0.025 -0.043 92
 Richland-Kennewick-Pasco,  WA 191,822 0.029 -0.117 -0.584 -0.640 -0.051 225 0.011 42 0.014 -0.044 93
 Lawrence,  KS 99,962 -0.148 -0.112 -0.070 -0.073 0.038 41 -0.129 190 -0.037 -0.045 94
  Des Moines, IA 456,022 -0.030 -0.123 -0.444 -0.469 -0.022 140 -0.037 78 -0.001 -0.045 95
  Kansas City, MO-KS 1,776,062 -0.001 -0.129 -0.547 -0.592 -0.037 184 -0.015 58 0.009 -0.046 96
 Non-metro,  MD 385,446 -0.033 -0.105 -0.360 -0.375 -0.022 -0.037 -0.010 -0.046
  Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 1,251,509 -0.046 -0.126 -0.414 -0.435 -0.016 126 -0.049 88 -0.006 -0.047 97
 Dayton-Springfield,  OH 950,558 -0.021 -0.124 -0.475 -0.506 -0.030 164 -0.030 71 -0.002 -0.049 98
 Bakersfield,  CA 661,645 0.044 -0.132 -0.684 -0.767 -0.063 252 0.020 36 0.019 -0.050 99
  Fort Walton Beach, FL 170,498 -0.204 -0.125 0.025 0.017 0.062 21 -0.174 241 -0.052 -0.050 100
 Lafayette,  IN 182,821 -0.070 -0.123 -0.336 -0.347 -0.006 98 -0.069 106 -0.016 -0.050 101
 Spokane,  WA 417,939 -0.097 -0.128 -0.281 -0.287 0.008 77 -0.090 138 -0.022 -0.050 102
  Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 1,088,514 0.004 -0.122 -0.532 -0.575 -0.044 204 -0.010 53 0.003 -0.050 103
  Bryan-College Station, TX 152,415 -0.138 -0.126 -0.162 -0.164 0.027 54 -0.122 176 -0.035 -0.051 104
  Lansing-East Lansing, MI 447,728 0.006 -0.126 -0.557 -0.605 -0.046 211 -0.008 52 0.004 -0.052 105
  Cedar Rapids, IA 191,701 -0.081 -0.137 -0.365 -0.378 -0.002 92 -0.078 115 -0.016 -0.052 106
 Flagstaff,  AZ-UT 122,366 -0.146 -0.128 -0.145 -0.147 0.030 50 -0.129 191 -0.038 -0.052 107
 Louisville,  KY-IN 1,025,598 -0.040 -0.138 -0.480 -0.510 -0.023 144 -0.047 86 -0.005 -0.053 108
 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah,  WI 358,365 -0.047 -0.138 -0.463 -0.489 -0.021 138 -0.052 91 -0.008 -0.054 109
 York,  PA 381,751 -0.026 -0.138 -0.518 -0.555 -0.032 175 -0.036 76 -0.003 -0.055 110
 Columbia,  SC 536,691 -0.076 -0.145 -0.410 -0.427 -0.007 99 -0.076 111 -0.015 -0.056 111
 Lincoln,  NE 250,291 -0.134 -0.150 -0.272 -0.277 0.022 62 -0.122 175 -0.029 -0.056 112
  Myrtle Beach, SC 196,629 -0.169 -0.135 -0.116 -0.119 0.038 42 -0.148 217 -0.045 -0.057 113
 Reading,  PA 373,638 -0.002 -0.146 -0.618 -0.676 -0.046 210 -0.017 62 0.004 -0.057 114
 Albany-Schenectady-Troy,  NY 875,583 -0.014 -0.132 -0.526 -0.565 -0.041 198 -0.026 68 -0.005 -0.058 115
 Sheboygan,  WI 112,646 -0.058 -0.146 -0.465 -0.490 -0.019 133 -0.062 98 -0.011 -0.058 116
 Rochester,  NY 1,098,201 -0.018 -0.136 -0.532 -0.572 -0.041 195 -0.029 69 -0.006 -0.059 117
 Bloomington-Normal,  IL 150,433 0.024 -0.149 -0.705 -0.788 -0.061 248 0.003 46 0.011 -0.060 118
 Champaign-Urbana,  IL 179,669 -0.082 -0.142 -0.385 -0.400 -0.009 112 -0.080 119 -0.022 -0.060 119
 Gainesville,  FL 217,955 -0.148 -0.156 -0.262 -0.267 0.024 58 -0.134 201 -0.035 -0.061 120
 Savannah,  GA 293,000 -0.081 -0.151 -0.426 -0.445 -0.011 115 -0.080 120 -0.019 -0.062 121
  Panama City, FL 148,217 -0.153 -0.159 -0.263 -0.267 0.026 56 -0.138 207 -0.036 -0.062 122
 Janesville-Beloit,  WI 152,307 -0.002 -0.164 -0.699 -0.775 -0.050 224 -0.019 64 0.007 -0.063 123
 Yuma,  AZ 160,026 -0.106 -0.158 -0.387 -0.401 0.002 88 -0.100 151 -0.024 -0.063 124
 Rochester,  MN 124,277 0.018 -0.164 -0.753 -0.848 -0.061 246 -0.003 47 0.012 -0.063 125
 Athens,  GA 153,444 -0.138 -0.153 -0.275 -0.281 0.016 68 -0.125 185 -0.037 -0.064 126
 Dover,  DE 126,697 -0.087 -0.158 -0.439 -0.458 -0.009 111 -0.086 133 -0.020 -0.064 127Full Name of Metropolitan Area Population Wages
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  Baton Rouge, LA 602,894 -0.045 -0.169 -0.601 -0.649 -0.031 166 -0.053 92 -0.005 -0.065 128
 Toledo,  OH 618,203 -0.025 -0.164 -0.636 -0.694 -0.041 196 -0.037 81 -0.001 -0.065 129
  Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 476,230 -0.108 -0.171 -0.434 -0.452 0.000 89 -0.104 154 -0.023 -0.066 130
 Non-metro,  AZ 603,632 -0.184 -0.163 -0.194 -0.197 0.037 -0.163 -0.048 -0.067
 Memphis,  TN-AR-MS 1,135,614 0.008 -0.178 -0.784 -0.886 -0.060 242 -0.013 54 0.011 -0.068 131
 Birmingham,  AL 921,106 -0.019 -0.179 -0.716 -0.794 -0.047 212 -0.034 73 0.003 -0.069 132
 Non-metro,  UT 524,673 -0.134 -0.171 -0.366 -0.376 0.010 -0.124 -0.033 -0.069
 Omaha,  NE-IA 716,998 -0.080 -0.195 -0.617 -0.663 -0.019 134 -0.084 128 -0.011 -0.072 133
  Daytona Beach, FL 493,175 -0.157 -0.185 -0.362 -0.372 0.019 63 -0.144 213 -0.036 -0.073 134
  Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 583,845 -0.099 -0.197 -0.572 -0.609 -0.011 119 -0.100 150 -0.017 -0.075 135
 Greenville,  NC 133,798 -0.081 -0.195 -0.613 -0.658 -0.022 139 -0.085 131 -0.014 -0.076 136
 Tuscaloosa,  AL 164,875 -0.098 -0.195 -0.564 -0.599 -0.013 124 -0.099 146 -0.020 -0.077 137
 Canton-Massillon,  OH 406,934 -0.079 -0.191 -0.602 -0.646 -0.024 148 -0.083 126 -0.017 -0.077 138
 Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers,  AR 311,121 -0.139 -0.206 -0.503 -0.526 0.005 82 -0.132 195 -0.029 -0.080 139
  Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 452,851 -0.020 -0.196 -0.783 -0.878 -0.056 234 -0.037 80 -0.002 -0.080 140
 Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson,  SC 962,441 -0.071 -0.210 -0.706 -0.771 -0.031 165 -0.078 114 -0.010 -0.081 141
 Elkhart-Goshen,  IN 182,791 -0.047 -0.204 -0.744 -0.822 -0.043 202 -0.059 96 -0.006 -0.081 142
  Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 1,170,111 -0.027 -0.190 -0.742 -0.824 -0.054 231 -0.042 84 -0.007 -0.081 143
  Benton Harbor, MI 162,453 -0.076 -0.194 -0.623 -0.671 -0.029 163 -0.081 121 -0.019 -0.081 144
 Columbia,  MO 135,454 -0.180 -0.204 -0.380 -0.390 0.023 60 -0.164 230 -0.044 -0.082 145
 Pittsburgh,  PA 2,358,695 -0.041 -0.207 -0.773 -0.860 -0.047 217 -0.054 93 -0.005 -0.082 146
 Cheyenne,  WY 81,607 -0.246 -0.214 -0.240 -0.245 0.056 24 -0.217 263 -0.059 -0.083 147
 Montgomery,  AL 333,055 -0.129 -0.209 -0.542 -0.570 -0.003 95 -0.124 183 -0.029 -0.083 148
 Rockford,  IL 371,236 -0.002 -0.211 -0.897 -1.033 -0.069 262 -0.024 67 0.005 -0.084 149
 Roanoke,  VA 235,932 -0.106 -0.212 -0.616 -0.658 -0.017 131 -0.107 162 -0.024 -0.085 150
 Fayetteville,  NC 302,963 -0.198 -0.209 -0.351 -0.359 0.028 52 -0.178 246 -0.051 -0.086 151
 Jackson,  MI 158,422 -0.014 -0.212 -0.870 -0.993 -0.064 259 -0.034 74 0.001 -0.086 152
 Lewiston-Auburn,  ME 90,830 -0.125 -0.229 -0.639 -0.683 -0.008 101 -0.123 180 -0.023 -0.087 153
 Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir,  NC 341,851 -0.127 -0.220 -0.592 -0.629 -0.008 105 -0.124 181 -0.028 -0.087 154
 Peoria-Pekin,  IL 347,387 -0.022 -0.217 -0.869 -0.989 -0.061 247 -0.041 83 -0.001 -0.088 155
  Glens Falls, NY 124,345 -0.110 -0.204 -0.573 -0.608 -0.020 136 -0.109 163 -0.033 -0.090 156
 Non-metro,  ME 808,317 -0.201 -0.229 -0.426 -0.439 0.027 -0.184 -0.048 -0.090
 Pensacola,  FL 412,153 -0.154 -0.232 -0.573 -0.604 0.003 85 -0.146 216 -0.034 -0.091 157
 Kokomo,  IN 101,541 0.069 -0.237 -1.208 -1.531 -0.110 276 0.029 33 0.030 -0.091 158
 Knoxville,  TN 687,249 -0.127 -0.231 -0.642 -0.686 -0.011 120 -0.125 184 -0.027 -0.091 159
 Springfield,  IL 201,437 -0.074 -0.222 -0.749 -0.823 -0.039 187 -0.082 124 -0.016 -0.091 160
 Non-metro,  MT 596,684 -0.266 -0.239 -0.294 -0.301 0.059 -0.236 -0.062 -0.091
 Tyler,  TX 174,706 -0.102 -0.234 -0.722 -0.786 -0.025 151 -0.106 160 -0.021 -0.093 161
  South Bend, IN 265,559 -0.060 -0.235 -0.842 -0.945 -0.047 214 -0.072 108 -0.009 -0.093 162
 Lexington,  KY 479,198 -0.088 -0.241 -0.790 -0.872 -0.033 177 -0.095 142 -0.015 -0.094 163
 Huntsville,  AL 342,376 -0.045 -0.244 -0.921 -1.053 -0.055 232 -0.062 99 -0.002 -0.094 164
 Jackson,  MS 440,801 -0.092 -0.246 -0.801 -0.886 -0.031 170 -0.099 149 -0.015 -0.095 165
 Billings,  MT 129,352 -0.180 -0.252 -0.582 -0.612 0.013 71 -0.169 236 -0.037 -0.095 166
 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton,  PA 624,776 -0.103 -0.236 -0.728 -0.793 -0.027 157 -0.106 161 -0.022 -0.095 167
  Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 403,070 -0.012 -0.239 -0.990 -1.158 -0.074 270 -0.035 75 0.003 -0.096 168
 Non-metro,  FL 1,144,881 -0.178 -0.247 -0.569 -0.597 0.010 -0.167 -0.040 -0.097
  Rocky Mount, NC 143,026 -0.111 -0.246 -0.750 -0.819 -0.024 145 -0.114 168 -0.022 -0.097 169Full Name of Metropolitan Area Population Wages
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  Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 359,062 -0.078 -0.245 -0.838 -0.936 -0.041 199 -0.088 135 -0.014 -0.098 170
 Wichita,  KS 545,220 -0.065 -0.257 -0.925 -1.052 -0.048 218 -0.079 116 -0.005 -0.098 171
 Tulsa,  OK 803,235 -0.096 -0.260 -0.849 -0.945 -0.032 172 -0.104 153 -0.013 -0.098 172
 Mobile,  AL 540,258 -0.129 -0.248 -0.709 -0.766 -0.016 128 -0.128 188 -0.027 -0.098 173
 Non-metro,  WY 345,642 -0.174 -0.256 -0.619 -0.655 0.007 -0.165 -0.037 -0.099
  Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 483,924 -0.116 -0.254 -0.770 -0.842 -0.023 142 -0.119 172 -0.022 -0.099 174
 Non-metro,  ID 786,043 -0.186 -0.251 -0.565 -0.592 0.012 -0.174 -0.043 -0.099
  Sioux Falls, SD 172,412 -0.149 -0.258 -0.694 -0.745 -0.006 97 -0.146 215 -0.030 -0.099 175
 Auburn-Opelika,  AL 115,092 -0.132 -0.252 -0.716 -0.773 -0.015 125 -0.132 196 -0.028 -0.100 176
  San Antonio, TX 1,592,383 -0.088 -0.254 -0.846 -0.943 -0.039 188 -0.097 143 -0.016 -0.100 177
 Killeen-Temple,  TX 312,952 -0.245 -0.249 -0.393 -0.404 0.040 40 -0.220 266 -0.061 -0.101 178
  La Crosse, WI-MN 126,838 -0.126 -0.247 -0.713 -0.771 -0.020 135 -0.126 187 -0.029 -0.101 179
 Amarillo,  TX 217,858 -0.146 -0.253 -0.684 -0.734 -0.010 113 -0.142 211 -0.033 -0.101 180
  Corpus Christi, TX 380,783 -0.099 -0.255 -0.820 -0.908 -0.034 179 -0.105 159 -0.019 -0.101 181
 Chattanooga,  TN-GA 465,161 -0.098 -0.258 -0.837 -0.930 -0.035 181 -0.105 158 -0.018 -0.102 182
  Las Cruces, NM 174,682 -0.205 -0.261 -0.554 -0.579 0.019 65 -0.190 254 -0.047 -0.102 183
  Rapid City, SD 88,565 -0.232 -0.266 -0.501 -0.520 0.033 47 -0.212 262 -0.052 -0.102 184
  Eau Claire, WI 148,337 -0.118 -0.256 -0.772 -0.845 -0.026 154 -0.120 174 -0.026 -0.103 185
 Wausau,  WI 125,834 -0.074 -0.265 -0.934 -1.063 -0.049 222 -0.086 134 -0.011 -0.105 186
 Non-metro,  WI 1,723,367 -0.116 -0.260 -0.795 -0.873 -0.028 -0.120 -0.025 -0.105
 Syracuse,  NY 732,117 -0.037 -0.251 -0.973 -1.127 -0.069 264 -0.056 95 -0.008 -0.105 187
  Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 128,012 -0.127 -0.271 -0.813 -0.894 -0.023 143 -0.129 189 -0.024 -0.106 188
  Fort Wayne, IN 502,141 -0.049 -0.268 -1.014 -1.180 -0.063 254 -0.067 105 -0.004 -0.106 189
 Pueblo,  CO 141,472 -0.168 -0.269 -0.689 -0.737 -0.003 94 -0.162 228 -0.038 -0.106 190
  Oklahoma City, OK 1,083,346 -0.133 -0.278 -0.826 -0.909 -0.020 137 -0.135 202 -0.024 -0.107 191
 Non-metro,  MI 1,768,978 -0.102 -0.258 -0.826 -0.915 -0.038 -0.108 -0.024 -0.107
 Non-metro,  NC 2,612,257 -0.150 -0.268 -0.736 -0.796 -0.013 -0.148 -0.034 -0.108
 Erie,  PA 280,843 -0.108 -0.268 -0.854 -0.949 -0.035 182 -0.114 167 -0.023 -0.108 192
 Springfield,  MO 325,721 -0.185 -0.272 -0.658 -0.699 0.003 84 -0.175 242 -0.043 -0.109 193
 Youngstown-Warren,  OH 594,746 -0.077 -0.276 -0.970 -1.111 -0.052 227 -0.090 137 -0.013 -0.110 194
 Jacksonville,  NC 150,355 -0.286 -0.264 -0.344 -0.353 0.051 32 -0.254 275 -0.077 -0.111 195
 Topeka,  KS 169,871 -0.135 -0.286 -0.854 -0.944 -0.024 147 -0.137 206 -0.027 -0.112 196
 Lubbock,  TX 242,628 -0.166 -0.282 -0.750 -0.810 -0.009 109 -0.161 227 -0.037 -0.112 197
 Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula,  MS 363,988 -0.132 -0.289 -0.875 -0.971 -0.026 156 -0.135 203 -0.025 -0.113 198
 Evansville-Henderson,  IN-KY 296,195 -0.093 -0.286 -0.970 -1.105 -0.047 213 -0.104 157 -0.017 -0.114 199
 Williamsport,  PA 120,044 -0.126 -0.282 -0.861 -0.955 -0.031 168 -0.130 192 -0.028 -0.114 200
 Sherman-Denison,  TX 110,595 -0.134 -0.291 -0.879 -0.976 -0.028 158 -0.137 205 -0.028 -0.115 201
 Augusta-Aiken,  GA-SC 477,441 -0.078 -0.294 -1.046 -1.216 -0.057 235 -0.093 140 -0.012 -0.116 202
 Ocala,  FL 258,916 -0.170 -0.298 -0.810 -0.883 -0.010 114 -0.166 232 -0.036 -0.117 203
  Lake Charles, LA 183,577 -0.066 -0.303 -1.118 -1.324 -0.064 258 -0.085 130 -0.006 -0.118 204
 Mansfield,  OH 175,818 -0.099 -0.294 -0.988 -1.129 -0.048 219 -0.110 164 -0.019 -0.118 205
  St. Cloud, MN 167,392 -0.100 -0.290 -0.969 -1.103 -0.048 220 -0.110 165 -0.022 -0.119 206
 Macon,  GA 322,549 -0.059 -0.299 -1.117 -1.326 -0.068 261 -0.079 117 -0.007 -0.119 207
 Goldsboro,  NC 113,329 -0.183 -0.297 -0.771 -0.833 -0.007 100 -0.176 243 -0.043 -0.120 208
 Dubuque,  IA 89,143 -0.148 -0.307 -0.909 -1.012 -0.024 146 -0.150 220 -0.029 -0.120 209
 Monroe,  LA 147,250 -0.126 -0.307 -0.966 -1.092 -0.036 183 -0.133 199 -0.024 -0.121 210
 Lynchburg,  VA 214,911 -0.137 -0.300 -0.911 -1.017 -0.031 169 -0.140 209 -0.030 -0.121 211Full Name of Metropolitan Area Population Wages
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  Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 392,302 -0.115 -0.308 -1.004 -1.146 -0.042 201 -0.124 182 -0.021 -0.121 212
 Muncie,  IN 118,769 -0.114 -0.304 -0.989 -1.126 -0.043 203 -0.122 177 -0.023 -0.121 213
 Non-metro,  IN 1,690,582 -0.101 -0.306 -1.033 -1.190 -0.050 -0.113 -0.019 -0.122
 Non-metro,  SC 1,205,050 -0.135 -0.311 -0.960 -1.082 -0.033 -0.140 -0.026 -0.122
 Non-metro,  OH 2,139,364 -0.099 -0.306 -1.041 -1.202 -0.052 -0.111 -0.019 -0.123
 Waco,  TX 213,517 -0.108 -0.311 -1.038 -1.195 -0.047 216 -0.118 171 -0.019 -0.123 214
 Jackson,  TN 107,377 -0.080 -0.322 -1.157 -1.377 -0.063 253 -0.098 144 -0.010 -0.125 215
 Bangor,  ME 90,864 -0.170 -0.324 -0.921 -1.023 -0.018 132 -0.169 235 -0.034 -0.126 216
 Decatur,  AL 145,867 -0.064 -0.326 -1.220 -1.480 -0.072 266 -0.085 132 -0.005 -0.126 217
 Albany,  GA 120,822 -0.082 -0.316 -1.129 -1.334 -0.063 255 -0.099 148 -0.014 -0.127 218
 Charleston,  WV 251,662 -0.103 -0.331 -1.133 -1.332 -0.052 226 -0.117 170 -0.014 -0.127 219
 Non-metro,  NM 783,991 -0.212 -0.324 -0.806 -0.872 0.002 -0.202 -0.046 -0.127
 Lima,  OH 155,084 -0.087 -0.322 -1.139 -1.347 -0.062 251 -0.103 152 -0.015 -0.129 220
 Sharon,  PA 120,293 -0.147 -0.319 -0.963 -1.083 -0.033 176 -0.151 222 -0.033 -0.129 221
 Non-metro,  NY 1,503,399 -0.115 -0.304 -0.985 -1.121 -0.050 -0.123 -0.031 -0.129
 Laredo,  TX 193,117 -0.200 -0.332 -0.870 -0.952 -0.008 103 -0.194 256 -0.045 -0.132 222
 Binghamton,  NY 252,320 -0.114 -0.313 -1.028 -1.179 -0.054 229 -0.123 179 -0.030 -0.133 223
 Houma,  LA 194,477 -0.110 -0.338 -1.146 -1.350 -0.054 230 -0.123 178 -0.018 -0.133 224
 Owensboro,  KY 91,545 -0.136 -0.338 -1.074 -1.236 -0.041 194 -0.144 214 -0.026 -0.133 225
  St. Joseph, MO 102,490 -0.167 -0.335 -0.976 -1.096 -0.026 152 -0.168 234 -0.036 -0.133 226
 Florence,  SC 125,761 -0.120 -0.341 -1.131 -1.324 -0.049 223 -0.131 194 -0.020 -0.133 227
 Non-metro,  GA 2,519,789 -0.140 -0.330 -1.029 -1.173 -0.040 -0.146 -0.031 -0.134
 Non-metro,  VA 1,550,447 -0.160 -0.334 -0.992 -1.118 -0.031 -0.162 -0.036 -0.135
 Clarksville-Hopkinsville,  TN-KY 207,033 -0.214 -0.342 -0.877 -0.959 -0.004 96 -0.206 259 -0.049 -0.136 228
 Florence,  AL 142,950 -0.142 -0.348 -1.102 -1.275 -0.042 200 -0.149 218 -0.027 -0.137 229
  San Angelo, TX 104,010 -0.177 -0.348 -1.006 -1.132 -0.025 149 -0.177 244 -0.038 -0.138 230
 Abilene,  TX 126,555 -0.235 -0.349 -0.848 -0.920 0.004 83 -0.223 268 -0.055 -0.139 231
 Decatur,  IL 114,706 -0.053 -0.349 -1.349 -1.699 -0.089 274 -0.080 118 -0.005 -0.140 232
 Lafayette,  LA 385,647 -0.116 -0.356 -1.207 -1.438 -0.057 236 -0.130 193 -0.019 -0.140 233
 Victoria,  TX 84,088 -0.083 -0.356 -1.299 -1.598 -0.074 269 -0.104 156 -0.010 -0.140 234
 Alexandria,  LA 126,337 -0.171 -0.358 -1.064 -1.213 -0.031 167 -0.173 239 -0.035 -0.142 235
 Casper,  WY 66,533 -0.228 -0.366 -0.941 -1.038 -0.002 91 -0.219 265 -0.048 -0.142 236
 Duluth-Superior,  MN-WI 243,815 -0.098 -0.356 -1.254 -1.519 -0.069 265 -0.116 169 -0.018 -0.143 237
  Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 480,091 -0.179 -0.363 -1.064 -1.211 -0.028 160 -0.180 248 -0.037 -0.144 238
 Hattiesburg,  MS 111,674 -0.178 -0.364 -1.071 -1.221 -0.029 161 -0.180 247 -0.037 -0.144 239
 Utica-Rome,  NY 299,896 -0.112 -0.342 -1.159 -1.367 -0.064 257 -0.125 186 -0.028 -0.144 240
  Great Falls, MT 80,357 -0.307 -0.373 -0.755 -0.801 0.036 44 -0.283 276 -0.069 -0.145 241
 Elmira,  NY 91,070 -0.120 -0.345 -1.148 -1.348 -0.061 245 -0.132 198 -0.031 -0.146 242
 Altoona,  PA 129,144 -0.150 -0.363 -1.142 -1.330 -0.045 207 -0.158 225 -0.032 -0.146 243
 Non-metro,  PA 1,889,525 -0.135 -0.364 -1.190 -1.405 -0.053 -0.145 -0.027 -0.146
  El Paso, TX 679,622 -0.158 -0.369 -1.148 -1.336 -0.041 197 -0.164 231 -0.031 -0.146 244
  Terre Haute, IN 149,192 -0.125 -0.372 -1.251 -1.502 -0.060 244 -0.139 208 -0.023 -0.148 245
 Cumberland,  MD-WV 102,008 -0.167 -0.365 -1.102 -1.267 -0.040 191 -0.171 238 -0.039 -0.150 246
 Non-metro,  IA 1,600,191 -0.192 -0.381 -1.105 -1.264 -0.027 -0.192 -0.039 -0.150
 Non-metro,  IL 1,877,585 -0.145 -0.369 -1.182 -1.389 -0.052 -0.154 -0.032 -0.150
 Odessa-Midland,  TX 237,132 -0.121 -0.382 -1.304 -1.588 -0.063 256 -0.136 204 -0.020 -0.151 247
 Fargo-Moorhead,  ND-MN 174,367 -0.168 -0.382 -1.174 -1.370 -0.039 190 -0.174 240 -0.033 -0.151 248Full Name of Metropolitan Area Population Wages
Housing 
Costs Linear Quadratic Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
APPENDIX TABLE A1: LIST OF METROPOLITAN AND NON-METROPOLITAN AREAS RANKED BY TOTAL AMENITY VALUE







 Non-metro,  MN 1,456,119 -0.157 -0.367 -1.142 -1.327 -0.047 -0.163 -0.037 -0.151
 Pocatello,  ID 75,565 -0.125 -0.396 -1.355 -1.669 -0.061 249 -0.141 210 -0.016 -0.152 249
 Columbus,  GA-AL 274,624 -0.140 -0.379 -1.237 -1.473 -0.055 233 -0.152 223 -0.029 -0.152 250
  Wichita Falls, TX 140,518 -0.234 -0.383 -0.995 -1.106 -0.008 102 -0.226 269 -0.053 -0.152 251
 Longview-Marshall,  TX 208,780 -0.136 -0.386 -1.280 -1.542 -0.057 237 -0.149 219 -0.025 -0.152 252
  Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 385,090 -0.035 -0.390 -1.574 -2.147 -0.108 275 -0.070 107 0.005 -0.153 253
 Sumter,  SC 104,646 -0.178 -0.388 -1.170 -1.361 -0.037 185 -0.182 249 -0.037 -0.154 254
 Non-metro,  TN 1,827,139 -0.185 -0.403 -1.219 -1.430 -0.038 -0.189 -0.037 -0.159
 Dothan,  AL 137,916 -0.181 -0.404 -1.232 -1.450 -0.04 193 -0.186 250 -0.037 -0.160 255
  Pine Bluff, AR 84,278 -0.156 -0.416 -1.353 -1.651 -0.053 228 -0.168 233 -0.025 -0.161 256
 Danville,  VA 110,156 -0.151 -0.403 -1.312 -1.586 -0.057 239 -0.163 229 -0.030 -0.162 257
  Sioux City, IA-NE 124,130 -0.147 -0.417 -1.385 -1.708 -0.06 243 -0.161 226 -0.024 -0.162 258
 Gadsden,  AL 103,459 -0.133 -0.421 -1.440 -1.810 -0.069 263 -0.15 221 -0.021 -0.165 259
 Anniston,  AL 112,249 -0.183 -0.424 -1.314 -1.576 -0.046 209 -0.19 253 -0.036 -0.168 260
 Joplin,  MO 157,322 -0.254 -0.417 -1.086 -1.223 -0.011 118 -0.246 272 -0.059 -0.168 261
  Fort Smith, AR-OK 207,290 -0.187 -0.433 -1.343 -1.620 -0.045 206 -0.194 255 -0.034 -0.169 262
 Enid,  OK 57,813 -0.218 -0.435 -1.267 -1.490 -0.032 173 -0.219 264 -0.045 -0.172 263
 Non-metro,  LA 1,098,766 -0.167 -0.435 -1.406 -1.733 -0.058 -0.178 -0.031 -0.172
 Non-metro,  TX 3,159,940 -0.200 -0.442 -1.341 -1.611 -0.043 -0.206 -0.041 -0.175
 Non-metro,  WV 1,042,776 -0.205 -0.445 -1.345 -1.614 -0.042 -0.21 -0.042 -0.176
 Non-metro,  SD 493,867 -0.291 -0.457 -1.157 -1.310 0.001 -0.279 -0.062 -0.178
 Jonesboro,  AR 82,148 -0.240 -0.452 -1.277 -1.498 -0.026 153 -0.238 271 -0.050 -0.178 264
 Lawton,  OK 114,996 -0.260 -0.448 -1.204 -1.384 -0.016 129 -0.253 274 -0.058 -0.178 265
 Wheeling,  WV-OH 153,172 -0.178 -0.448 -1.430 -1.767 -0.058 240 -0.189 251 -0.035 -0.178 266
 Steubenville-Weirton,  OH-WV 132,008 -0.178 -0.448 -1.429 -1.766 -0.058 241 -0.189 252 -0.036 -0.179 267
 Jamestown,  NY 139,750 -0.140 -0.430 -1.459 -1.840 -0.079 273 -0.157 224 -0.034 -0.180 268
 Non-metro,  AR 1,352,381 -0.238 -0.457 -1.306 -1.541 -0.028 -0.237 -0.049 -0.180
 Non-metro,  KY 2,068,667 -0.182 -0.456 -1.456 -1.810 -0.057 -0.193 -0.035 -0.180
  Grand Forks, ND-MN 97,478 -0.204 -0.455 -1.387 -1.683 -0.046 208 -0.21 261 -0.042 -0.180 269
 Parkersburg-Marietta,  WV-OH 151,237 -0.153 -0.457 -1.537 -1.975 -0.072 268 -0.17 237 -0.027 -0.180 270
 Non-metro,  MO 1,800,410 -0.256 -0.456 -1.248 -1.449 -0.023 -0.251 -0.059 -0.183
 Non-metro,  NE 811,425 -0.261 -0.464 -1.271 -1.481 -0.021 -0.256 -0.057 -0.184
 Huntington-Ashland,  WV-KY-OH 315,538 -0.160 -0.477 -1.603 -2.098 -0.074 271 -0.177 245 -0.027 -0.188 271
 Non-metro,  KS 1,167,355 -0.240 -0.469 -1.351 -1.611 -0.035 -0.24 -0.053 -0.188
 Non-metro,  AL 1,338,141 -0.174 -0.477 -1.568 -2.019 -0.067 -0.189 -0.031 -0.188
 Johnstown,  PA 232,621 -0.190 -0.476 -1.519 -1.917 -0.062 250 -0.201 258 -0.039 -0.191 272
  Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 129,749 -0.185 -0.498 -1.625 -2.124 -0.068 260 -0.2 257 -0.033 -0.196 273
 Non-metro,  OK 1,352,292 -0.255 -0.496 -1.424 -1.720 -0.034 -0.255 -0.054 -0.197
  Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 335,227 -0.211 -0.502 -1.570 -1.998 -0.057 238 -0.221 267 -0.041 -0.198 274
 Non-metro,  MS 1,820,996 -0.202 -0.517 -1.660 -2.180 -0.066 -0.215 -0.037 -0.203
 Bismarck,  ND 94,719 -0.244 -0.532 -1.610 -2.052 -0.048 221 -0.25 273 -0.047 -0.208 275
 Non-metro,  ND 358,234 -0.260 -0.532 -1.565 -1.959 -0.041 -0.262 -0.052 -0.208
 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission,  TX 569,463 -0.212 -0.570 -1.861 -2.641 -0.079 272 -0.228 270 -0.039 -0.225 276State Name Population Wages
Housing 
Costs Linear Quadratic Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank
 Hawaii 1,211,537 -0.015 0.530 2.311 1.852 0.182 1 0.045 10 -0.02 0.211 1
 California 33,871,648 0.126 0.458 1.615 1.360 0.085 2 0.148 3 0.019 0.18 2
 New  Jersey 8,414,350 0.189 0.336 0.919 0.832 0.012 18 0.186 1 0.039 0.131 3
 Connecticut 3,405,565 0.165 0.278 0.737 0.678 0.006 20 0.160 2 0.034 0.108 4
 Massachusetts 6,349,097 0.094 0.251 0.816 0.749 0.034 9 0.101 5 0.017 0.098 5
 New  York 18,976,457 0.120 0.199 0.524 0.416 0.003 22 0.116 4 0.025 0.077 6
 Washington 5,894,121 0.026 0.181 0.706 0.631 0.046 7 0.040 12 0.001 0.072 7
 Colorado 4,301,261 -0.016 0.172 0.781 0.705 0.065 4 0.006 16 -0.01 0.069 8
 New  Hampshire 1,235,786 0.033 0.164 0.613 0.566 0.037 8 0.044 11 0.004 0.065 9
  District of Columbia 572,059 0.126 0.154 0.314 0.307 -0.015 . 0.116 . 0.028 0.059 .
 Alaska 626,932 0.050 0.130 0.418 0.399 0.016 15 0.054 8 0.009 0.051 10
 Maryland 5,296,486 0.110 0.126 0.239 0.229 -0.016 29 0.101 6 0.025 0.049 11
 Oregon 3,421,399 -0.045 0.106 0.579 0.534 0.058 5 -0.024 20 -0.015 0.043 12
 Rhode  Island 1,048,319 0.021 0.082 0.294 0.283 0.016 16 0.026 15 0.003 0.032 13
 Illinois 12,419,293 0.065 0.063 0.091 0.025 -0.013 26 0.058 7 0.015 0.024 14
 Nevada 1,998,257 0.054 0.054 0.082 0.069 -0.010 25 0.048 9 0.012 0.021 15
 Arizona 5,130,632 -0.027 0.019 0.158 0.150 0.021 13 -0.019 17 -0.008 0.008 16
 Delaware 783,600 0.043 -0.010 -0.159 -0.167 -0.025 33 0.033 14 0.011 -0.005 17
 Utah 2,233,169 -0.055 -0.023 0.053 0.046 0.021 12 -0.046 26 -0.014 -0.008 18
 Florida 15,982,378 -0.060 -0.036 0.013 -0.009 0.020 14 -0.051 27 -0.015 -0.013 19
 Vermont 608,827 -0.172 -0.056 0.232 0.213 0.071 3 -0.142 39 -0.043 -0.02 20
 Michigan 9,938,444 0.051 -0.061 -0.402 -0.444 -0.047 49 0.034 13 0.015 -0.025 21
 Virginia 7,078,515 -0.035 -0.085 -0.268 -0.313 -0.010 24 -0.036 23 -0.006 -0.033 22
 Wisconsin 5,363,675 -0.035 -0.099 -0.328 -0.371 -0.014 28 -0.038 24 -0.006 -0.039 23
 New  Mexico 1,819,046 -0.148 -0.136 -0.176 -0.229 0.032 10 -0.132 36 -0.034 -0.052 24
 Minnesota 4,919,479 -0.009 -0.134 -0.548 -0.629 -0.039 43 -0.021 18 0.002 -0.053 25
 Pennsylvania 12,281,054 -0.011 -0.135 -0.549 -0.623 -0.039 41 -0.023 19 0.001 -0.054 26
 North  Carolina 8,049,313 -0.084 -0.141 -0.373 -0.403 -0.003 23 -0.081 29 -0.017 -0.055 27
 Ohio 11,353,140 -0.024 -0.143 -0.548 -0.614 -0.035 39 -0.034 22 -0.002 -0.057 28
 Georgia 8,186,453 -0.021 -0.145 -0.562 -0.637 -0.037 40 -0.032 21 -0.001 -0.057 29
 Maine 1,274,923 -0.160 -0.171 -0.294 -0.318 0.027 11 -0.145 41 -0.036 -0.066 30
 Indiana 6,080,485 -0.031 -0.168 -0.633 -0.730 -0.039 42 -0.043 25 -0.003 -0.066 31
 Texas 20,851,820 -0.041 -0.203 -0.754 -0.891 -0.045 46 -0.054 28 -0.005 -0.08 32
 Idaho 1,293,953 -0.148 -0.212 -0.502 -0.538 0.007 19 -0.139 38 -0.032 -0.082 33
 South  Carolina 4,012,012 -0.100 -0.214 -0.640 -0.713 -0.018 30 -0.102 30 -0.019 -0.083 34
 Montana 902,195 -0.256 -0.237 -0.313 -0.330 0.055 6 -0.227 48 -0.059 -0.09 35
 Missouri 5,595,211 -0.106 -0.247 -0.766 -0.859 -0.026 34 -0.111 32 -0.02 -0.097 36
 Tennessee 5,689,283 -0.101 -0.249 -0.787 -0.899 -0.029 36 -0.107 31 -0.019 -0.097 37
 Wyoming 493,782 -0.193 -0.264 -0.599 -0.639 0.014 17 -0.181 46 -0.042 -0.102 38
 Louisiana 4,468,976 -0.104 -0.264 -0.844 -0.990 -0.032 37 -0.111 33 -0.019 -0.103 39
 Iowa 2,926,324 -0.140 -0.293 -0.870 -0.986 -0.024 32 -0.142 40 -0.027 -0.114 40
 Kansas 2,688,418 -0.132 -0.312 -0.975 -1.131 -0.034 38 -0.137 37 -0.025 -0.122 41
 Nebraska 1,711,263 -0.174 -0.319 -0.886 -1.007 -0.014 27 -0.172 43 -0.035 -0.124 42
 Alabama 4,447,100 -0.114 -0.318 -1.051 -1.264 -0.046 48 -0.124 34 -0.02 -0.125 43
 Kentucky 4,041,769 -0.121 -0.326 -1.066 -1.286 -0.045 45 -0.130 35 -0.021 -0.128 44
 Arkansas 2,673,400 -0.185 -0.364 -1.050 -1.223 -0.023 31 -0.185 47 -0.037 -0.142 45
 Oklahoma 3,450,654 -0.178 -0.369 -1.091 -1.269 -0.029 35 -0.181 45 -0.035 -0.144 46
 South  Dakota 754,844 -0.252 -0.389 -0.974 -1.088 0.003 21 -0.240 50 -0.053 -0.151 47
 West  Virginia 1,808,344 -0.161 -0.392 -1.239 -1.511 -0.045 47 -0.169 42 -0.03 -0.154 48
 Mississippi 2,844,658 -0.167 -0.427 -1.370 -1.738 -0.054 50 -0.178 44 -0.03 -0.167 49
 North  Dakota 642,200 -0.234 -0.495 -1.478 -1.831 -0.041 44 -0.238 49 -0.046 -0.193 50
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Quadratic inferred land rents based on calibration: phiL =0.2333, phiN =0.6167, sigmaY =0.6667 